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Abstract
While expanding federal involvement in the health care system, the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) preserves states' roles as
policy laboratories and private providers' roles as health care delivery
laboratories. State-based and provider-based laboratories suffer from many
shortcomings, however, as mechanisms to develop, evaluate, and facilitate
diffusion of reforms within the health system. This Article argues that the
federal government can take steps to address these shortcomings. It first
briefly reviews ACA provisions that promote policy and delivery
experimentation. It then suggests that by tying funding to policy outcomes,
making use of regulatory variation and regulatory menus, and conditioning
waivers on systematic evaluation, the federal government could further
improve the performance of the nation as a laboratory.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)1 has the
potential to completely transform the American health care system. Easily
the most significant piece of federal health care-related legislation since the
adoption of the Medicare and Medicaid programs, it will expand the
availability of health insurance and change the way that individual and small
group insurance markets work. It will also accelerate health care delivery
reforms. Whether the ACA achieves its full potential as a transformative
force, however, remains to be seen. It may spur more evolution than
revolution. Its success and speed in achieving policy goals such as
expanding access, limiting costs, and improving quality will depend on its
ability to foster innovation in health care coverage, finance, delivery, and
regulation.
The ACA provides an opportunity to study innovation in a context in
which federal, state, and private actors all play important roles in effecting
change. Health care providers continually seek new ways to improve patient
care. State governments frequently try out new approaches to expanding
health care access and regulating health care providers. At the same time,
the federal government is increasingly taking responsibility for financing
health care. With this increased responsibility has come an increased
interest in pushing for changes in the health care system. The ACA
proceeds even further in this direction. While preserving important roles for
states in managing access to the health care system, the ACA relies heavily
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as
amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat.
1029 (2010).
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on federal reform as an engine for health system experimentation.
The term “health system experimentation” is intended to capture many
distinct but interrelated concepts. By “health system,” I mean not just the
health care delivery system, but also the regulatory framework that supports
it and the policies that shape it. By “experimentation,” I mean not just the
initial conception or implementation of a new approach to health care
delivery or a novel regulation or policy, but also the longer-term processes
of evaluating and promoting the diffusion of innovations.
The ACA innovates in many ways. Just by virtue of its status as a
newly enacted federal statute, it necessarily engages in policy innovation of
a sort: it imposes new mandates. It requires individuals to purchase health
insurance or pay a penalty,2 requires large employers to provide insurance or
pay a tax,3 and prohibits insurers from charging higher premiums or refusing
to issue policies based on individuals’ health status.4 At the same time, the
ACA seeks to encourage further innovation in both policy and delivery
through exceptions to its mandates.5 It permits waivers, for example, for
states that adopt alternative means of ensuring coverage for their residents.6
It also provides for waivers of certain existing mandates, such as fraud and
abuse laws that might otherwise impede the development of accountable
care organizations (ACOs), which policymakers hope will improve the
quality and efficiency of health care services.7
Perhaps the most obvious evidence of the ACA’s commitment to
experimentation is its creation of demonstration projects and new institutions
devoted to promoting innovation in health care policy and delivery. For
example, the part of the legislation entitled “Encouraging Development of
New Patient Care Models”8 describes a variety of demonstration and pilot
projects, such as a program under which payments to providers will be
2. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1501, 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (2012).
3. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1513, 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2012).
4. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1201, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3 (2012)
(prohibiting exclusion based on preexisting conditions as well as premiums tied to health status).
5. As described in this Article, waivers can be used to promote innovation by removing legal
impediments. See infra notes 32–33 and accompanying text. At the same time, they can be used to
preserve existing arrangements that do not comply with new requirements; when used in this way,
waivers can retard innovation. But even this type of waiver can be viewed as promoting innovation
if it lowers the costs of transitions or makes the underlying innovative mandate more feasible.
6. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1332, 42 U.S.C. § 18052 (2012).
7. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3022, 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj (2012).
8. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act tit. III, pt. 3 (2010).
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bundled so as to encourage more efficient delivery of care.9 The ACA
establishes the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation to administer
future demonstration projects. It will have a long-term mission of “test[ing]
innovative payment and service delivery models to reduce program
expenditures . . . while preserving or enhancing the quality of care.”10 The
ACA also establishes the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute,
which will alter the provision of care through research. Its mission is to
“assist patients, clinicians, purchasers, and policy-makers in making
informed health decisions by advancing the quality and relevance of
evidence concerning the manner in which diseases, disorders, and other
health conditions can effectively and appropriately be prevented, diagnosed,
treated, monitored, and managed.”11
Collectively, these examples demonstrate a much enhanced role for the
federal government in fostering innovation in health care policy and
practice. To some, this enhanced role might seem unusual. The federal
bureaucracy is not often thought of as a leading source of innovation.
Innovation in health care products and services is often thought to be the
work of private individuals, companies, and provider organizations that,
inspired by the prospect of financial rewards, professional recognition, or
healthier or happier patients, find new ways to provide treatment.
Innovation in health care policy is often thought to be the work of state
governments. The metaphor of states as laboratories—generally attributed
to a 1932 dissenting opinion in which Justice Brandeis noted that “[i]t is one
of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country”12—suffuses
the health policy literature.13
9. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3023, 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-4 (2012).
10. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3021, 42 U.S.C. § 1315a (2012).
11. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 6301, 42 U.S.C. § 1320e (2012).
12. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The
importance of federalism for experimentation was recognized long before this opinion. Scott L.
Greer & Peter D. Jacobson, Health Care Reform and Federalism, 35 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L.
203, 207 (2010) (“Federalism enables a people to try experiments which could not safely be tried in
a large centralized country.” (citation omitted)).
13. See generally, e.g., Randall R. Bovbjerg, Joshua M. Wiener & Michael Housman, State and
Federal Roles in Health Care: Rationales for Allocating Responsibilities, in FEDERALISM & HEALTH
POLICY 25–51 (John Holahan, Alan Weil & Joshua M. Wiener eds., 2003); Greer & Jacobson, supra
note 12; Michael S. Sparer & Lawrence D. Brown, States and the Health Care Crisis: Limits and
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The question that the ACA raises, then, is what the growing federal
presence in the health care system means for a process of experimentation
that has so often occurred at a more granular level. Part II of this Article
describes the roles of the federal government, state governments, and health
care providers in fostering health system experimentation. It suggests that
the ACA’s effect is not to displace other actors’ contributions to innovation
and evaluation, but instead to redirect them. Part III explores why these
contributions may be in need of redirection. It examines factors that
undermine providers’ efforts to innovate and the shortcomings of the stateas-laboratory model of policy experimentation. It then details ways in which
the ACA addresses these problems.
Part IV considers steps the federal government might take to build a
better federal laboratory. It suggests three broad approaches. First, the
federal government could spur more state policy innovation through funding
programs that provide the same sort of financial incentives to states as those
currently offered to private health care providers. Second, the federal
government could facilitate policy evaluation either by applying different
rules to different entities (“regulating with variation”) or by offering a
regulatory menu from which entities could choose. Finally, it could
encourage more systematic analysis of innovations by conditioning waivers
or regulatory exceptions on commitments to practices that facilitate
evaluation, such as participation in randomized trials. Part V concludes.
II. STATES AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS AS LABORATORIES
The ACA has been described by its opponents as a “federal takeover” of
the health care system.14 As a lengthy federal statute focused on health care,
Lessons of Laboratory Federalism, in HEALTH POLICY, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN
STATES 181–200 (Robert F. Rich & William D. White eds., 1996); Charles Barrilleaux & Paul
Brace, Notes from the Laboratories of Democracy: State Government Enactments of Market- and
State-Based Health Insurance Reforms in the 1990s, 32 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 655 (2007);
Howard Leichter, Commentary, State Health Policy Analysis: On the Abuse of Metaphor and the
Pathology of Variation, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 897 (1997); Michael S. Sparer, Laboratories
and the Health Care Marketplace: The Limits of State Workforce Policy, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y
& L. 789 (1997).
14. See, e.g., Sen Hutchison Calls for State Opt Out Amendment to Health Care, KTRE,
http://www.ktre.com/story/12196113/sen-hutchison-calls-for-state-opt-out-amendment-to-healthcare (last visited Jan. 13, 2014); Robert Pear, States Decide on Running New Pools for Insurance,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/30/health/policy/30health.html?_r=0
(quoting Georgia insurance commissioner as describing the high-risk insurance pool as “the first step
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it certainly increases federal involvement in many aspects of the health care
system. As this Part explains, however, the ACA still leaves room for states
and health care providers to act as laboratories.
A. States as Laboratories
Scholars have devoted considerable effort to analyzing the roles of state
and federal governments in the development and diffusion of health care
policy.15 Much of this literature refers to and amplifies upon the Brandeis
state-as-policy-laboratory metaphor,16 but the meanings that scholars attach
to the metaphor vary. Michael Sparer and Lawrence Brown identify four
“images” of state policy laboratories:
The first image is state officials and policy analysts working
together to test theoretical policy hypotheses. The second is the
image of states looking at and learning from other states, and
adapting imported ideas to their own conditions. The third image
pictures federal officials adopting national reforms that have been
pioneered and tested in the states. The fourth, and most “lab-like,”
image is that of social scientists studying state policy initiatives,

in the recently enacted federal takeover of the United States health care system”).
15. See generally, e.g., Randall R. Bovbjerg, Alternative Models of Federalism: Health
Insurance Regulation and Patient Protection Laws, in FEDERALISM & HEALTH POLICY 361–89
(John Holahan, Alan Weil & Joshua M. Wiener eds., 2003); Howard M. Leichter, State
Governments and Their Capacity for Health Care Reform, in HEALTH POLICY, FEDERALISM, AND
THE AMERICAN STATES 151–73 (Robert F. Rich & William D. White eds., 1996); Robert F. Rich &
William D. White, Health Care Policy and the American States: Issues of Federalism, in HEALTH
POLICY, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN STATES 3–33 (Robert F. Rich & William D. White eds.,
1996); Carolyn Hughes Tuohy, Variation in Health Care Policy in the American States: The Dog
that Didn’t Bark, in HEALTH POLICY, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN STATES 203–17 (Robert F.
Rich & William D. White eds., 1996); Robert F. Rich & William D. White, Health Care Policy and
the American States: Issues of Federalism, in HEALTH POLICY, FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN
STATES (Robert F. Rich & William D. White eds., 1996); Carolyn Hughes Tuohy, Variation in
Health Care Policy in the American States: The Dog That Didn’t Bark, in HEALTH POLICY,
FEDERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN STATES (Robert F. Rich & William D. White eds., 1996);
Thomas J. Anton, New Federalism and Intergovernmental Fiscal Relationships: The Implications
for Health Policy, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 691 (1997); Abigail R. Moncrieff, Essay,
Federalization Snowballs: The Need for National Action in Medical Malpractice Reform, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 844 (2009).
16. See supra note 13.
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evaluating programs, and suggesting improvements.17
These four images capture several different ways that states might be
said to function as laboratories. First, they share a presumption that at least
one state is willing and able to adopt an innovative policy. States cannot
serve as laboratories unless some are mavericks. Second, all four images
include references to testing or evaluation processes of some sort, and the
first and fourth images highlight these processes. Finally, the second and
third images focus on policy transmission. When one state adopts a new
policy that appears to achieve some success, its model will be studied and
may be replicated by other states as well as by the federal government.
States clearly have the potential to serve all of these functions. States
frequently adopt innovative policies; these policies are often assessed in
some way and then replicated at the state or federal level. Managed care
regulations, for example, spread quickly from state to state.18 Key healthrelated parts of the federal statutes COBRA19 and HIPAA20 can be traced to
state initiatives, as can the federal Medigap program21 and the federal
diagnosis-related group hospital payment method.22 In fact, the ACA can be
traced to a state program: Massachusetts provided a model for the ACA’s
state-based exchanges as well as for its individual mandate.23
The ACA allows state laboratories to continue to operate in this way.
While it imposes numerous mandates,24 it offers states the flexibility
17. Sparer & Brown, supra note 13, at 188–89.
18. See Bovbjerg, supra note 15, at 384.
19. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82
(1986).
20. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936
(1996).
21. Medigap (Medicare Supplement Health Insurance), CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Health-Plans/Medigap/index.html?redirect=/medigap (last
visited Jan. 14, 2014).
22. See Bovbjerg, supra note 15, at 384 (discussing COBRA, Medigap, and HIPAA); Bovbjerg,
Wiener & Housman, supra note 13, at 42 (discussing diagnosis-related groups).
23. See generally Kavita Patel & John McDonough, From Massachusetts to 1600 Pennsylvania
Avenue: Aboard the Health Reform Express, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1106 (2010) (describing
Massachusetts health reform as a model for national reform). The Massachusetts health care reform
that served as a model for the ACA was financed in part through subsidies associated with a federal
Medicaid waiver, demonstrating how federal efforts to provide flexibility at the state level can
benefit federal policymakers seeking to design new federal programs. See id. at 1108 (explaining
waivers in Massachusetts).
24. See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text.
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necessary for experimentation.25 Rather than creating a single national
insurance program, it relies on states to implement policies and programs
that will facilitate access to insurance coverage.26 The ACA increases
coverage for low-income individuals by retaining and expanding upon
existing Medicaid programs, which are operated by the states under federal
guidelines.27 It permits states to design and operate the exchanges through
which federal subsidies will flow to individual purchasers of insurance
packages.28 The federal government has now also turned to states to identify
the essential health benefits that must be included in individual and small
group insurance products.29 Rather than specify the content of each of the
ACA’s ten mandated categories of health benefits through federal
regulation,30 the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) has
allowed states to define essential health benefits based on “benchmark”
insurance plans offered within the state.31 For each of these examples, the
ACA and its associated federal regulations will impose some limits on what
states can do, but states will be permitted to adopt innovative policies within
these limits.
The ACA also allows for some state experiments through waivers.32
Waivers facilitate innovation by freeing interested states from otherwise
applicable statutory or regulatory requirements, allowing them to try
different policy approaches. Some waivers are issued for reasons that have
little to do with promoting experimentation,33 but others are more clearly
25. See New Report Details Affordable Care Act Resources and Flexibility for States, U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Feb. 25, 2011), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2011pres/
02/20110225a.html.
26. See id.
27. See The Medicaid Program at a Glance, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Mar. 4, 2013),
http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/7235-04.pdf (describing the Medicaid program generally);
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2001, 42 U.S.C. 1396 (2012) (mandating expansion of
the Medicaid program).
28. See generally Jon Kingsdale & John Bertko, Insurance Exchanges Under Health Reform:
Six Design Issues for the States, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1158 (2010) (describing functions of exchanges).
29. Id.
30. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1302(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1)
(2012) (“essential health benefits”).
31. Additional Information on Proposed State Essential Health Benefits Benchmark Plans,
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/DataResources/ehb.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2014).
32. See generally Kingsdale & Bertko, supra note 28.
33. A number of ACA waivers appear to be intended to preserve the pre-ACA status quo, rather
than to support future experimentation. See Robert Pear, Four States Get Waivers to Carry Out
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directed at allowing regulated entities to pursue innovations that would
otherwise run afoul of statutory or regulatory constraints.34 The ACA takes
this route when it allows states to seek broad waivers of requirements related
to the operation of state health benefit exchanges as long as they meet
certain minimum coverage requirements consistent with the ACA and do not
increase the federal deficit.35 It is not clear how many states will take
advantage of such a waiver, but it is one that could support future
experimentation.36
These are just a few of the many ways in which states continue to have a
role in shaping health policy and health care delivery under the ACA. The
motivation for preserving state flexibility may or may not include a desire to
promote the development, evaluation, and diffusion of health system
innovations. The reasons that the ACA and other federal programs are
designed to accommodate state flexibility are undoubtedly both numerous

Health Law, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/17/health/
policy/17health.html (describing grant of waivers to Florida, New Jersey, Ohio, and Tennessee
permitting insurers to provide plans with coverage more limited than ACA-required levels). For
example, HHS has accepted some state requests for waivers of the ACA’s minimum insurance
coverage requirements, as well as some state requests for adjustments to the federal minimum loss
ratio, which sets the threshold of medical spending below which insurance companies will be
required to rebate a portion of premiums to their enrollees. See id.; Medical Loss Ratios for Health
Insurance, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/
health-insurance-medical-loss-ratios.aspx (last updated June 20, 2013) (explaining loss ratio and
providing a list of 2011 state waiver applications and results, amongst other information about
waivers from medical loss ratio requirements); Medical Loss Ratio, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/CCIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/Health-Insurance-MarketReforms/Medical-Loss-Ratio.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2014). A federal statute mandates rebates in
the small group and individual markets when medical loss ratios fall below 80%, but allows the
Secretary to “adjust such percentage with respect to a State if the Secretary determines that the
application of such 80 percent may destabilize the individual market in such State.” 42 U.S.C. §
300gg-18(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2012).
34. In an article from the mid-1990s, Elizabeth Andersen identified three types of Medicaidrelated waivers: “(1) demonstration waivers, permitting short-term experimentation and analysis of
innovative policies; (2) programmatic waivers, approving particular formulaic, longer-term policy
changes; and (3) congressionally mandated waivers, implementing express congressional mandates
regarding particular policy innovations.” Elizabeth Andersen, Administering Health Care: Lessons
from the Health Care Financing Administration’s Waiver Policy-Making, 10 J.L. & POL. 215, 216–
17 (1994).
35. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1332, 42 U.S.C. § 18052 (2012) (“Waiver
for State innovation”).
36. For an argument that this waiver provision is a problematic approach to encouraging state
innovation, see Stuart Butler, The Wyden-Brown Bill—Short on State Flexibility, 364 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 397 (2011).
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and varied, reflecting historical, practical, and political factors. Ultimately,
however, regardless of its justifications, the ACA’s reliance on state
involvement in policy implementation leaves room for states to experiment
and learn from one another’s successes and failures.
B. Delivery Systems as Laboratories
Much of Part II.A’s discussion of state-led health system
experimentation focused on Title I of the ACA, which contains requirements
related to health coverage. Much of health care providers’ discussion of the
ACA, however, revolves around Title III. Entitled “Improving the Quality
and Efficiency of Health Care,” Title III contains a number of provisions
intended to reform health care delivery.37 While some states have actively
encouraged delivery reform, states’ laboratory functions tend to be more
limited in this domain than in the health care coverage domain.38 The
laboratories that are most prominent in the health care delivery context are
instead those that belong to health care providers.
The primary purpose of health care delivery systems is to provide
medical care.39 But, like states, delivery systems also serve as laboratories of
policy experimentation in the sense that they sometimes adopt novel policies
and practices, and the consequences of these reforms are sometimes
evaluated by those seeking to improve their own policies and practices.40 In
fact, the parallels between delivery systems and scientific laboratories may
be closer than the parallels between states and scientific laboratories, given
37. For example, Title III’s subtitles include Subtitle A, “Transforming the Health Care Delivery
System,” Subtitle B, “Improving Medicare for Patients and Providers,” and Subtitle F, “Health Care
Quality Improvements.” Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010).
38. For examples of some state delivery reform initiatives, see generally S. Comm. on Health,
Education, Labor & Pensions, Health Care Delivery System Reform and the Patient Protection &
Affordable Care Act (2012) (report from Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse for the Committee), available at
http://www.whitehouse.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Health%20Care%20Delivery%20System%20Ref
orm%20and%20The%20Affordable%20Care%20Act%20FINAL2.pdf; Nat’l Acad. for State Health
Policy, Re-Forming Health Care Delivery Systems: A Summary of a Forum for States and Health
Centers 10–16, available at http://www.nashp.org/sites/default/files/hrsa.system.reform.pdf; Nat’l
Governors Ass’n, State Roles in Delivery System Reform 5 (2010), available at
http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/1007DELIVERYSYSTEMREFORM.PDF.
39. See Lower Costs, Better Care: Reforming Our Health Care Delivery System, CTRS. FOR
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/
MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-Sheets/2013-Fact-Sheets-Items/2013-02-28.html.
40. See HEALTH CARE DELIVERY SYSTEM REFORM, supra note 38, at 13–15.
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the nature of medical practice. Delivery systems are generally staffed by
scientifically trained health care providers and are sometimes affiliated with
academic institutions—thus, delivery systems may sometimes be more
attentive than state governments to the need to systematically study the
impact of their reforms.
Why are health care delivery systems willing to serve as laboratories,
adopting changes that may then be mimicked by other providers? First,
providers may act from a simple desire to improve quality of life, either for
themselves or for their patients. Second, physicians and other providers
working within these systems have a professional obligation to deliver high
quality care.41 Third, individual and institutional providers may have an
intrinsic desire to establish a reputation for offering high quality care.
Finally, providers may respond to outside pressures to alter health care
delivery.42 The most obvious kind of pressure is direct, command-andcontrol public regulation, or private regulation, such as hospital accreditation
requirements.43 Regulation can promote quality-improving and efficiencyenhancing change. But the more prescriptive the regulation is, the less room
it leaves for future experimentation. A second form of outside pressure
arises from market forces.44 Payment mechanisms can be designed to
reward quality and efficiency, increasing providers’ incentives to reform
their approaches to health care delivery; competition can further reinforce
these incentives.45 As long as these payment mechanisms allow for
flexibility in delivery approaches, they can help to create an environment
conducive to experimentation.46
While the federal government does impose some regulations on health

41. One description of the principles of medical professionalism refers to the “primacy of patient
welfare” and the “[c]ommitment to improving quality of care.” Troy Brennan et al., Medical
Professionalism in the New Millennium: A Physician Charter, 136 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 243,
244–45 (2002).
42. See infra notes 43–46 and accompanying text.
43. See Hospital Accreditation, JOINT COMMISSION, http://www.jointcommission.org/
accreditation/hospitals.aspx (last visited Jan. 16, 2014) (describing hospital accreditation program).
44. See Len M. Nichols, Paul B. Ginsburg, Robert A. Berenson, Jon Christianson & Robert E.
Hurley, Are Market Forces Strong Enough to Deliver Efficient Health Care Systems? Confidence Is
Waning, 23 HEALTH AFF. 8, 12 (2004) (discussing the effects of market forces on health care
providers).
45. See id.
46. See id.
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care providers participating in federal health care programs,47 federal
regulators are not permitted to “exercise any supervision or control over the
practice of medicine or the manner in which medical services are provided”
or “over the administration or operation” of providers in connection with the
Medicare program.48 The ACA does not eliminate this restriction. Instead
of seeking to change patterns of medical care through direct regulation, it
puts in place measures likely to encourage providers to alter their
practices—an approach to health care delivery reform that Part III will
discuss in more detail. For the purposes of this Part, the key point is simply
that the ACA allows for a wide range of provider-initiated innovations in
health care delivery systems. It permits provider-based experimentation to
continue.
III. BUILDING A FEDERAL LABORATORY
Part II of this Article suggested that the ACA takes advantage of states’
and health care providers’ traditional roles as laboratories by allowing them
the freedom to develop innovative policies. But freedom does not always
lead to experimentation. Flexibility permits but does not guarantee
innovation.
Similarly, flexibility does not guarantee and can even
undermine the evaluation that is central to experimentation. This Part argues
that by addressing weaknesses in the state-as-laboratory model of policy
development, federal involvement can facilitate more systematic
development and evaluation of beneficial policies and practices. At the
same time, by addressing longstanding weaknesses in health care markets,
federal involvement can foster greater innovation and evaluation in health
care delivery. This Part discusses the steps that the ACA has taken in both
of these directions, in effect building a federal laboratory that fosters
experimentation nationwide.
A. The Problems with State Laboratories
Part II argued that the ACA provides the necessary flexibility for the
policy diffusion contemplated by the state-as-laboratory metaphor. But the
fact that states are given flexibility does not necessarily mean they will reach

47.
48.
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their full potential as laboratories.49 To some, the laboratory metaphor might
suggest that as long as states are permitted to innovate, a body of knowledge
about policy effectiveness will begin to accumulate, just as scientific
knowledge does. However, there are many ways in which the process of
policy development, evaluation, and diffusion differs from the scientific
process as it occurs in laboratory settings.50 In thinking about the ideal
federal role in health policymaking, it may be helpful to consider the limits
to the state-as-laboratory metaphor.
How do laboratories ordinarily work? A laboratory is a physical setting
in which experimentation occurs.51 Scientists formulate hypotheses, design
experiments to test these hypotheses, and then conduct these experiments in
laboratories to better control the conditions under which experimentation52
occurs. Careful controls help to contain experiments’ effects within the
laboratory, facilitate efforts to assess the impact of the scientist’s
interventions, and permit replication of experiments by others. After
completing their experiments, scientists evaluate and report their laboratory
experiments’ results, allowing others to make use of the knowledge that has
emerged.
Even this brief description of the process of experimentation suggests
several ways in which the comparison of a state to a laboratory is inapt. To
begin with, states may more closely resemble the scientists in this
description than the laboratories. If “state officials and policy analysts
work[] together to test theoretical policy hypotheses,” as suggested by
Sparer and Brown’s first image of the state-as-laboratory metaphor, then
innovative states may act like scientists in the sense that they seek to develop
knowledge.53 Consistent with this image, states do occasionally engage in

49. See discussion infra Part III.A–B.
50. Michael Abramowicz, Ian Ayres & Yair Listokin, Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV.
929, 949 (2011).
51. For a discussion of the nature of experiments, see Sparer & Brown, supra note 13, at 187
(discussing hypothesis testing in a laboratory setting, including the need for replication); James A.
Gardner, The “States-As-Laboratories” Metaphor in State Constitutional Law, 30 VAL. U. L. REV.
475, 480–82 (1996) (discussing scientific experimentation); Peter S. Menell, Regulating “Spyware”:
The Limitations of State “Laboratories” and the Case for Federal Preemption of State Unfair
Competition Laws, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1363, 1373–75 (2005) (highlighting critical features of
experimentation).
52. See Gardner, supra note 51, at 480.
53. See Sparer & Brown, supra note 13, at 188–89; see also supra note 17 and accompanying
text (describing four images of states as laboratories).
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formal policy experiments in which they test and evaluate the outcomes of
particular policy approaches.54
More often, though, when observers refer to states as laboratories, they
refer simply to situations in which states adopt novel laws or policies.55 A
state adopting an innovative policy could be analogized to a scientist
formulating a novel hypothesis, and policy innovation could be analogized
to hypothesis generation. But if the state does not then systematically test its
hypothesis by evaluating the effects of its policy, the comparison between
the state and scientist fails. A more appropriate label for the state in this
scenario may be “experimental subject” or “laboratory rat.” Each state
adopting a new policy essentially becomes an observation in a bigger
experiment that will often involve multiple states. An outside researcher can
gather information from innovating states and perhaps from other states in
an attempt to ascertain the impact of the innovative policies.
There are a few senses in which states could be said to act as
“laboratories” rather than as scientists or experimental subjects. First, if a
state implements a policy that permits variation across geographic subunits
such as cities or counties, the state as a whole can serve as a laboratory in the
sense that its laws, regulations, and other statewide characteristics serve as
controls for the experiment. Second, a state might be said to serve as a
laboratory in the sense that a policy experiment is conducted within it, just
as a scientific experiment is conducted within a physical laboratory. In some
cases, consistent with Justice Brandeis’s view,56 the policy experiment’s
effects will be contained within the state’s borders, and these effects will
generate information for outside observers just as laboratory experiments do.
Sparer and Brown’s four images of the state-as-laboratory metaphor—
images that involve both the testing of policy innovations and their
subsequent replication—could be said to implicitly capture all these roles for
states: state as scientist, state as subject, and state as laboratory.57 Indeed,
54. See, e.g., Daniel Chandler et al., Client Outcomes in Two Model Capitated Integrated
Service Agencies, 47 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 175 (1996) (describing and evaluating a pilot program
that reformed the financing and delivery of mental health services in two California counties).
55. See, e.g., Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Forced Federalism: States as Laboratories of
Immigration Reform, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1673, 1676 (2011) (discussing the use of the state-aslaboratory metaphor in the context of new state immigration laws and policies). CunninghamParmeter argues that states do not serve as effective laboratories in the immigration context. Id. at
1679.
56. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310–11 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
57. See Sparer & Brown, supra note 13, at 188–89.
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the state-as-laboratory metaphor may be used to refer more generally to the
entire scientific process, including the development of a hypothesis, the
testing of that hypothesis, and the dissemination of the results of the test.58
This close examination of the state-as-laboratory metaphor yields two
benefits. First, the observation that states may act as scientists or subjects
rather than laboratories in this process is important because it suggests that
the “laboratory” label might sometimes be a better fit for the country as a
whole. If the nation is a laboratory and individual states are merely
formulating hypotheses or participating in experiments, then it seems that
the federal government might have an important role to play in ensuring the
quality of experimentation.59
Second, this discussion invites a more careful look at not just the
similarities between scientific experimentation and policy experimentation,
but also the distinctions. The distinctions are numerous.60 In fact, the
distinctions arise even before the experimentation might be said to begin:
While scientists are rewarded financially and professionally for producing
knowledge through experimentation, states may not be. As a result, states
are not always eager to engage in the innovation that is so integral to
experimentation.
Researchers have identified many impediments to
innovation. Theoretical models suggest that rational politicians may be
unwilling to undertake risky innovation.61 Governments may be unwilling to
58. See Gardner, supra note 51, at 480.
59. Other authors have highlighted the federal role in facilitating experimentation, although they
offer differing views on that role. See, e.g., Shannon K. McGovern, A New Model for States as
Laboratories for Reform: How Federalism Informs Education Policy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1519, 1549
& n.169 (2011) (stating that “[o]ne way to conceptualize the federal role is as a laboratory assistant
who simultaneously observes and provides research support for a number of experiments, drawing
inferences from the results and serving as an information repository for future experiments,” and
contrasting that view with another author who advocates for a more expansive role for the federal
government).
60. For a discussion of the distinctions between policy experimentation and scientific
experimentation, see David A. Dana, State Brownfields Programs as Laboratories of Democracy?,
14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 86, 97–100 (2005) (describing five elements of laboratory experiments and
distinguishing them from states’ brownfields programs); Gardner, supra note 51, at 480–82
(explaining differences between policy and scientific experimentation and observing that the “image
of scientific experimentation conjured up by the laboratories metaphor is misleading”); Menell,
supra note 51, at 1373–75 (explaining the scientific method and its inapplicability to experiments in
internet policy); Sparer & Brown, supra note 13, at 187 (contrasting hypothesis testing in a
laboratory and in social science work).
61. See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism
Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593 (1980) (analyzing models of political risk taking,
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engage in full experimentation because doing so would require some of them
to adopt practices perceived to be less desirable than the status quo or other
alternatives.62
States have no incentive to take into account the
informational benefits that their experiments will produce for others.63
States may ultimately decide that it is better to rely on the results of
experiments conducted (and funded) by others.
Collectively, these
considerations imply that states may experiment less than would be socially
optimal.64
Abigail Moncrieff identifies another reason that states may not engage
in policy reform as often as they should: federal programs that help out state
residents interfere with states’ incentives to innovate.65 When the federal
government takes on significant financial responsibility for state residents,
states do not bear the full costs of their policies, and therefore will not reap
the full financial benefit from reforming those policies.66 As a result, they
will be less inclined to engage in cost-reducing reforms than would be
including that of a centralized system, a decentralized system, and a “federal” system).
62. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis,
41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 925 (1994); see also Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of
Democracy? Policy Innovation in Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1368–69
(2009) (discussing situations where states are reluctant to innovate because of a risk of lower returns
than the status quo); cf. David A. Super, Laboratories of Destitution: Democratic Experimentalism
and the Failure of Antipoverty Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 566 (2008) (pointing to ethical
concerns that arise when “some outcomes” of a democratic experiment “may be far more probable
than others”).
63. In addition, states have little incentive to account for the direct effects of their policies on
other states. For a discussion of policy spillovers, see Moncrieff, supra note 15, at 868–72 (2009).
If the spillovers are positive, states making decisions based purely on their own welfare will
undersupply reforms relative to the social optimum.
64. Brian Galle and Joseph Leahy, after a thorough review and analysis of the literature on state
policy innovation, conclude that “there is social underprovision of experimentation by small
jurisdictions.” Galle & Leahy, supra note 62, at 1370. Galle and Leahy examine a number of
factors that might ensure continued state innovation, including the possibility that states may not be
able to free ride when there are significant differences in state characteristics, see Galle & Leahy,
supra note 62, at 1346–61; the possibility that there might be an advantage for the state that adopts
an innovative policy first, id. at 1361–67; and the possibility that the differences in state policy goals
and risk preferences will generate policy diversity, id. at 1369. They nevertheless reach the
conclusion that policy experimentation will be undersupplied relative to the social optimum. Id. at
1398.
65. See generally Moncrieff, supra note 15 (discussing implications of federalization).
66. See id. at 847 (“While a given state fully internalizes the benefits of inefficient malpractice
laws, that state does not bear the full cost of the inefficiencies. Instead, it externalizes a significant
(and ever-growing) portion of those costs onto the federal government and, by extension, onto the
other forty-nine states.”); id. at 847–48.
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efficient. Moncrieff illustrates this point with the example of medical
malpractice. She argues that because the federal government funds health
care through Medicare, Medicaid, tax breaks, and other programs, states are
able to externalize the costs associated with their medical liability systems
onto the federal government (such as the costs associated with defensive
medicine).67 For this reason, she argues, the federal government should take
a more active role in malpractice and patient safety reform.68 The same
argument could be applied to any reform with health care cost implications,
including state reforms of laws, regulations, and policies regarding health
care cost, quality, and access. In short, federal involvement in financing
health care means that states have suboptimal incentives to implement costreducing reforms.
Even when a state does choose to innovate, it may not produce
knowledge that benefits other states. While scientific experiments are
designed to generate knowledge by answering specific questions, states most
often design and implement innovative policies in the hope of achieving a
desired policy objective.69 The goal of generating new knowledge is often
secondary, if it exists at all.70 A number of commentators have observed that
states have little incentive to structure their policy experiments in ways that
will generate data useful for other states.71
Even if a state is willing to share its data, the data may not reveal much
about the impact of the program. The fundamental problem is that policy
innovation does not take place within a laboratory, but within the real world,
where it is difficult to implement adequate controls. Without adequate
controls, researchers may not be able to determine whether an outcome
resulted from the experimental intervention or from an unrelated variable.
Unable to directly control the environment in which an experiment
occurs, social scientists have turned to a variety of methods to try to sort out
causation. Occasionally, they test policies through randomized controlled

67. See id. at 848–50 (summarizing argument).
68. See id. at 882–89 (proposing types of federal involvement).
69. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 51, at 480–81 (describing goals in policy experimentation).
70. See id. at 481–82.
71. See, e.g., Galle & Leahy, supra note 62, at 1351 (“As [Rose-Ackerman] points out,
information about an experiment that might prove useful to others is typically an externality for the
experimenter.” (footnote omitted)); Abigail R. Moncrieff & Eric Lee, The Positive Case for
Centralization in Health Care Regulation: The Federalism Failures of the ACA, 20 KAN. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 266, 277 (2011); Rubin & Feeley, supra note 62, at 926.
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trials.72 More often, though, empirical researchers take advantage of natural
experiments, tracking policies adopted by states and the possible outcomes
the policies might influence.73 They may compare the outcomes of
individuals affected by a new policy to those of individuals not affected by
the policy. Researchers can also use statistical techniques to control for
other state-related factors that contribute to policy outcomes.
Applying these techniques in the policy setting can be challenging.
Real-life reforms may be adopted after a change in conditions within the
state, complicating efforts to distinguish the effects of the reform from the
effects of the changed conditions. They may also involve multiple
simultaneous innovations, complicating efforts to disentangle the impacts of
each of the individual innovations. And while many analysts use regression
techniques to control for state factors that might affect policy outcomes, the
more relevant state factors that exist, the less successful this approach is
likely to be; at some point, the number of relevant factors overwhelms the
number of data points available to pin them down.74 In an article advocating
randomization of law, Michael Abramowicz, Ian Ayres, and Yair Listokin
identify a number of problems associated with regression analyses, including
omitted variable bias, which occurs when models omit factors that contribute
to policy results, leading researchers to make incorrect inferences about the
impact of the policy itself.75 As the authors observe, “[t]he difficulties that
social scientists and especially policymakers face in assessing the results of
state innovations contribute to the inaptness of the states-as-laboratories
metaphor.”76
72. See DAVID GREENBERG ET AL., SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION AND PUBLIC POLICYMAKING
37–40 (2003) (noting a decrease in federal funds and an increase in state funds for social
experiments); Abramowicz et al., supra note 50, at 948 (noting that “randomized experiments have
increasingly been conducted within states”).
73. See Michelle M. Mello & Kathryn Zeiler, Empirical Health Law Scholarship: The State of
the Field, 96 GEO. L.J. 649 (2008) (reviewing methods for studying the impact of health law); Ryan
W. Scott, Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First Look, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1, 24
(2010) (“Unlike a controlled experiment, in which researchers themselves change a condition to
study its effects, a natural experiment examines the effects of exogenous changes that occur in the
world without any prompting by researchers, such as the enactment of a new law or a series of
Supreme Court decisions.”).
74. See Moncrieff & Lee, supra note 71, at 276–77 (citing “demographic and sociological
diversity among the states” as the biggest limit “to the usefulness of state-based experiments”).
75. See Abramowicz et al., supra note 50, at at 938–48. They also discuss problems of
publication bias and model misspecification. See id. at 943–46.
76. Id. at 947.
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In addition, idiosyncratic variations in policies preclude straightforward
inferences about the effects of particular policy approaches. Robert Hurley
and Stephen Zuckerman’s discussion of federal waivers in the context of
innovations in state Medicaid operations illustrates this problem.77 In the
1980s and 1990s, many states sought “Section 1115” waivers of certain
federal requirements in order to implement reforms in their Medicaid
programs.78 The waiver program attempted to overcome any reluctance
states might otherwise have to share relevant information with others by
imposing “detailed reporting and oversight requirements . . . designed to
facilitate research and evaluation, thus generating knowledge.”79 However,
by 1997, “[w]hile some new programs maintained a semblance of their
original research and demonstration function, waivers increasingly
authorized highly idiosyncratic models of reform and programmatic
changes.”80
Section 1115 waivers continue to provide an important outlet for state
innovation and variation, supporting expansions in Medicaid coverage,
modifications to payment mechanisms, and changes in delivery systems.81
The more idiosyncratic and varied the models that Section 1115 waivers
support, however, the harder it will be to establish the models’ effects. In
essence, the same flexibility that fosters innovation undermines evaluation.
In a more constrained world, there might be more examples of a
particular type of innovative model. An increased number of observations
may enhance researchers’ ability to separate the effects of the model from
the effects of other factors that might contribute to policy outcomes.82 The
Section 1115 programs may be effective demonstration programs in that

77. Robert E. Hurley & Stephen Zuckerman, Medicaid Managed Care: State Flexibility in
Action, in FEDERALISM & HEALTH POLICY 215, 220–22 (John Holahan, Alan Weil & Joshua M.
Wiener eds., 2003).
78. Id. at 221.
79. Id. On the nature and use of Medicaid waivers under Section 1115 of the Social Security
Act, see Madhu Chugh, Executive Authority to Reform Health: Options and Limitations, 37 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 22, 25 (2009) (stating that as of January 2007, there were 110 Medicaid and SCHIP
Section 1115 waivers and that fourteen million beneficiaries received coverage through waiver
programs). See generally Andersen, supra note 34 (describing Medicaid waiver programs).
80. Hurley & Zuckerman, supra note 77, at 222.
81. See Five Key Questions and Answers About Section 1115 Medicaid Waivers, KAISER
FAMILY FOUND. (June 30, 2011), http://kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/five-key-questions-andanswers-about-section/.
82. See Hurley & Zuckerman, supra note 77, at 227–30.
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they permit observers to assess whether states can overcome the logistical
challenges of implementing new policies.83 Administrators can share their
views about aspects of the program that seem to work well and aspects that
do not. The programs are less well suited, however, to systematic,
comparative evaluation.
Admittedly, policy evaluation does not always require randomized
controlled trials. Books on program and policy evaluation are filled with
advice on how to assess policy implementation in real-world settings, and
the randomized controlled trial is just one of many options.84 All are
consistent with Sparer and Brown’s fourth image of states as laboratories,
which involves “social scientists studying state policy initiatives, evaluating
programs, and suggesting improvements.”85 At the same time, however, the
many limitations to these methods collectively mean that while states may
try to learn from one another’s experiences, they will often need to confront
challenges that laboratory scientists do not face. The question, then, is
whether increased federal involvement can help address these challenges.
B. The Problems with Delivery System Laboratories
Health care providers, like states, occasionally engage in
experimentation. Hospitals, physicians, and other providers may innovate in
the delivery of care, just as states may innovate in their financing or
regulation of health care.86 Hospitals may act like scientists, conducting
studies in order to assess the impact of internal delivery reforms, or like
experimental subjects, participating in multi-institutional experiments
evaluated by outside researchers. Hospitals sometimes act as laboratories in
83. See id.
84. See, e.g., CAROL H. WEISS, EVALUATION 180–93 (2d ed. 1998) (describing different
methods for evaluating programs and policy processes and outcomes). Both the approaches to
evaluation and evaluation goals are highly varied. See MELVIN M. MARK, GARY T. HENRY &
GEORGE JULNES, EVALUATION: AN INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING, GUIDING,
AND IMPROVING POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 97 (2000) (describing the relationship between four
“inquiry modes” of evaluation, “description,” “classification,” “causal analysis,” and “values
inquiry,” and three purposes of evaluation, “oversight and compliance,” “program and organizational
improvement,” and “knowledge development.”). The limitations of states as laboratories may
undermine some evaluation forms more than others.
85. Sparer & Brown, supra note 13, at 188–89.
86. See David M. Cutler, Where Are the Health Care Entrepreneurs? The Failure of
Organizational Innovation in Health Care 15 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
16030, 2010).
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the sense that they supply the setting for delivery reform innovation within
their own walls. In all of these ways, delivery system laboratories could be
said to resemble state laboratories.
Delivery systems laboratories also resemble state laboratories in that
they may face suboptimal incentives to innovate.87 Hospitals’ incentives to
innovate are likely weaker than those of for-profit entities in other
industries.88 Typically, for-profit producers engage in revenue-enhancing or
cost-reducing innovations because doing so generates profits. When they
find a way to increase the quality of a good, they may be able to raise prices
and attract more customers; if they reduce production costs, they can
undersell their competitors. Competitors facing a loss in customers may
then respond with innovations of their own. The potential for profit
associated with an innovation obviously depends on many factors, including
the nature of the innovation and the nature of the underlying market, but the
central point is simply that in many industries, innovation can lead to higher
rewards.
Like providers of other goods and services, health care providers can
and do innovate in quality-enhancing and cost-reducing ways. Physicians
have a professional obligation to improve the quality of care for their
patients, and health care providers must find ways to keep costs below
reimbursement levels in order to remain afloat. But the characteristics of
health care markets weaken the financial incentives that would otherwise
exist for health care innovation.89 One cause of market imperfections is the
lack of information about health care quality.90 Patients can judge the
convenience and attractiveness of a facility, the attentiveness of providers,
and certain other aspects of the care they receive. Patients are often not able
to assess the clinical quality of their care, however. They generally cannot
independently determine whether a provider’s treatment recommendation
was consistent with current medical knowledge, whether the outcome they
experienced was due to the care delivered, or whether the outcome would
87. See generally Sparer & Brown, supra note 13.
88. See Laura Landro, The Time to Innovate Is Now, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 28, 2011),
http://on.wsj.com/1e6jSHK (“Unlike many other industries, health care has remained highly
fragmented, with a hierarchical culture resistant to change, and a payment system that rewards
providers for quantity rather than quality of care.”).
89. The health economist David Cutler points to two factors that impede organizational
innovation in health care: “lack of good information on quality” and “the stagnant compensation
system of public insurance plans.” Cutler, supra note 86, at 3.
90. See id.
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have been better if another type of treatment had been given. Unless they
find a way to overcome this information deficit, health care providers who
do improve their quality may not be rewarded with an influx of patients.91
Providers who improve their quality may not be rewarded with higher
prices, either. Patients are probably not willing to pay higher prices for an
improvement in quality they cannot assess.92 But even if they were willing
to pay the higher price, it is often not the patient who pays the provider, but
the patient’s insurer.93 Historically, payers have not been much better
positioned than patients to assess quality and have not adjusted their
payments to account for quality, instead paying fixed fees for whatever
services were provided.94 While a reputation for providing high quality care
might generate bargaining power that translates into higher fees, such as
when an insurer’s customers insist that a particular hospital system be
included in an insurer’s network, this link between payment and quality is
indirect and would be unlikely to strongly incentivize delivery innovations
across a range of hospitals.95 Without more direct ties between payment and
quality, the financial incentive to engage in quality-enhancing innovation
will be limited.
The nature of health care markets also limits provider incentives to
innovate in cost-reducing ways. Health care providers face pressure to
control costs for each service they provide, but this pressure may not extend
to controlling total costs of treatment for a patient. Many service providers
are compensated on a fee-for-service basis,96 which means that as long as the
compensation level is sufficiently high, they can increase profits by
providing more services. Thus, while they have an incentive to economize
on the costs of providing a given service, they might not have an incentive to
reduce the number of services they provide.97 Thus, current payment
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 25.
94. See id. at 3.
95. See id. at 21–22.
96. See id. at 20.
97. In addition, hospitals seeking to reduce costs face a further challenge: The physicians who
make many decisions that influence hospitals’ costs are often independent of the hospital and not the
hospital’s employees. See Gail B. Agrawal, Resuscitating Professionalism: Self-Regulation in the
Medical Marketplace, 66 MO. L. REV. 341, 356–59 & n.78 (2001) (“Physicians influence or control
approximately seventy-five percent of health care spending through their practice patterns.”); id. at
n.78 (noting that “physicians are usually independent contractors, rather than employees” of
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practices impede robust competition based on the total costs of treatment.
Other factors that might hinder innovation include the lack of provider
competition in some markets and, in more competitive markets, the
difficulty of preventing competitors from duplicating a successful
innovation. Complex regulations can also slow innovation in the health care
industry, as they do in other industries.98 This partial list of barriers to health
care delivery innovation hints at the magnitude of the difficulties involved in
reforming the health care system. Delivery experiments, like state policy
experiments, can be difficult to get started.
Some of the same problems that plague efforts to evaluate and
disseminate information about state policies also appear in the health care
delivery setting. An innovative hospital may have little incentive to share
the evaluation of its results with other hospitals, for example. In addition,
the same factors that impede innovation may reduce providers’ commitment
to evaluation. Evaluation will generate little financial return unless it is
essential for making delivery changes that improve net revenues. If the
nature of health care markets precludes such rewards, then other incentives
must be used to support evaluation.
It is true that some aspects of the delivery system culture may make
evaluation and information dissemination occur more readily in health care
delivery than in health care policy. For example, by their very nature,
teaching hospitals combine health care delivery with teaching and research
functions; they may therefore be more inclined to systematically study the
impact of health reforms. Nevertheless, the impediments to evaluation in the
health care provider setting suggest that flexibility will not necessarily lead
to full experimentation.
Thus, the shortcomings in delivery system experimentation raise the
same question as the shortcomings in state experimentation: Can increased
federal involvement in the health care system improve health system
experimentation?

managed care organizations). See generally Mark Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior:
Legal Barriers to Health Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431 (1988). This
independence restricts hospitals’ ability to implement innovations that would reduce their own costs.
See generally Hall, supra note 97.
98. See Regina A. Herzlinger, Why Innovation in Health Care Is So Hard, HARV. BUS. REV.
(2006), http://hbr.org/web/extras/insight-center/health-care/why-innovation-in-health-care-is-so-hard
(noting that sometimes government regulation can hinder innovation in health care).
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C. The ACA’s Federal Laboratory
Many of the ACA’s provisions evidence a commitment to expanded
federal involvement in health system innovation and research. For example,
the ACA creates the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute to
“advanc[e] the quality and relevance of evidence concerning the manner in
which diseases, disorders, and other health conditions can effectively and
appropriately be prevented, diagnosed, treated, monitored, and managed.”99
But the ACA also contains a number of more targeted federal initiatives that
appear designed to address some of states’ and providers’ shortcomings as
laboratories, facilitating future experimentation. This subpart discusses
these initiatives.
1. Federal Support for Experiments Involving States
As illustrated in Part III.A, the weaknesses of the state-as-laboratory
model of policy experimentation include states’ reluctance to innovate, their
disinclination to develop and share information when they do innovate, and
their tendency to adopt highly varied policies that have the effect of
obscuring the relationship between policy features and policy outcomes.
The ACA works to overcome states’ suboptimal incentives to innovate
in two ways: mandates and subsidies. If the federal government sought to
increase access to care by enacting a single-payer system or requiring that
everyone purchase individual insurance from a nationally regulated insurer,
there would be little reason or room for states to find innovative ways to
increase access. But, as discussed in Part II, the ACA preserves a significant
role for states in increasing their residents’ access to care. For example,
under the ACA, states will develop and operate health benefit exchanges
through which individuals and small businesses will be able to purchase
health insurance.100 By defining basic features of the exchanges, but leaving
states much discretion with respect to exchange operations, the ACA will
tend to engender variation in state approaches and leave room for state
innovation.
The federal government has also provided financial support to states
seeking to innovate in connection with the ACA. By lowering the cost of
99. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 6301, 42 U.S.C. § 1320e (2012).
100. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1311(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1)
(2012).
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innovation, the ACA helps promote innovation.101 The ACA provides grants
for states to use in the development of exchanges,102 and HHS gave “Early
Innovator” grants to support states’ efforts to build the information
technology infrastructure of these exchanges—infrastructure that could then
be “adopted and tailored by other states.”103 Rewarding early innovators in
this way incentivizes greater production of innovation and encourages faster
dissemination of information. The ACA also subsidizes state innovation
through funding for demonstration programs operated at the state level. For
example, it authorizes funding for state demonstration projects involving the
“development, implementation, and evaluation of alternatives to current tort
litigation for resolving disputes over injuries allegedly caused by health care
providers or health care organizations.”104
While funding for demonstration projects clearly plays an important role
in supporting state innovation, so does the mere existence of federally
defined demonstration projects. Federal demonstration projects involving
states are perhaps the clearest example of a federal laboratory at work. The
constraints fashioned by the federal government to define demonstration
projects focus states’ attention on particular goals and mechanisms for
achieving those goals.105
In essence, the constraints determine the
hypothesis to be tested. The constraints also facilitate efforts to test the
hypotheses by permitting more systematic evaluation of the impact of
innovations that states adopt.106 In these ways, the impact of demonstration
projects can extend beyond what might be achieved by simply permitting

101. Analysts who recognize that states may have suboptimal incentives to innovate have
suggested awarding prizes to encourage further innovation. See Galle & Leahy, supra note 62, at
1361 (citing Rose-Ackerman, supra note 61, at 615–16, for the observation “that a centralized
planner can prompt innovation by offering grants or prizes to local innovators, presumably in
amounts tied to the approximate size of the externality they produce,” as well as other sources’ ideas
for rewarding local experimentation).
102. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1311(a), 42 U.S.C. § 18031(a) (2012).
103. See States Leading the Way on Implementation: HHS Awards “Early Innovator” Grants to
Seven States, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (Feb. 16, 2011),
http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2011pres/02/20110216a.html.
104. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 10607, 42 U.S.C. § 280g-15 (2012).
105. See Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State
Implementation of Federal Law in Health Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 589–92 (2011).
106. Cf. Moncrieff & Lee, supra note 71, at 283 (arguing that “fully nationalizing” Medicaid
funding under the ACA, which was not done, would have replaced “haphazard[]” state
experimentation with “a thoughtfully structured process to produce and replicate good policy
nationwide”).
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states the flexibility to innovate.107
A number of commentators have recognized both the potential
contributions of states that innovate and the potential benefits of the
involvement of some centralized authority in coordinating states’ efforts.
Rubin and Feeley, for example, note that a central authority seeking to
determine which policy would achieve a particular objective could “order
different sub-units to experiment with different strategies until the best way
to achieve the goal emerges.”108 This approach would use a mandate to
overcome states’ reluctance to innovate, while at the same time permit more
systematic evaluations of policies than is possible when states innovate in an
ad hoc way.109 Abramowicz, Ayres, and Listokin similarly envision a
regime in which governments could operate experiments across geographic
areas. They argue that “government should embrace randomized trials of
statutes and regulations as a tool for testing the effectiveness of those
laws”110 and note that “it may be possible to randomize policies across states,
at least among states that consent.”111
As the ACA illustrates, however, the federal government is more likely
to turn to demonstration programs or pilot projects than to randomized
controlled trials as a way of advancing experimentation.112 For example,
under one demonstration program, state Medicaid programs will use bundled
payments to pay for the care of beneficiaries.113 States seeking to participate
in the demonstration must specify the episodes of care and specific services
to be included in the program, but the Secretary is permitted to modify these
parameters and to vary them across participating states.114 In other words,
107. See Gluck, supra note 105; Moncrieff & Lee, supra note 72, at 283.
108. Rubin & Feeley, supra note 62, at 924.
109. See generally Rubin & Feeley, supra note 62, at 924 (explaining why federalism is not
conducive to scientific experimentation and the kinds of coordination that would be necessary to
engage in robust experimentation). They conclude that “[i]t is thus hardly surprising, even given the
most favorable assumptions about the rationality and conscientiousness of state governments, that
most significant ‘experimental’ programs in recent years have in fact been organized and financed
by the national government.” Id. at 925.
110. Abramowicz et al., supra note 50, at 933.
111. Id. at 948.
112. Federal regulatory experiments do sometimes occur; Abramowicz, Ayres, and Listokin have
discussed an example involving the Securities and Exchange Commission. See Abramowicz et al.,
supra note 50, at 988–91.
113. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2704 (“Demonstration project to evaluate
integrated care around a hospitalization”), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a note (2012).
114. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2704(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a note (2012).
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states are permitted to innovate, but the federal government may impose
constraints that could be used to improve the quality of experimentation.115
Other state-based demonstration projects involve Medicaid global
capitation payments to safety-net hospitals,116 malpractice liability reform,117
and insurer-sponsored wellness programs.118
The ACA did not invent the demonstration project—demonstrations
have long been used as mechanisms to test new approaches to health system
reform.119 The ACA took a clear step toward supporting greater growth in
demonstration projects, however, by establishing the Center for Medicare
and Medicaid Innovation (CMI), which will “test innovative payment and
service delivery models to reduce program expenditures . . . while
preserving or enhancing the quality of care”120 and by appropriating ten
billion dollars for its operations from 2011 to 2019.121 This dedicated
funding will substantially increase the federal government’s ability to
conduct policy experiments.122
Perhaps equally important, the ACA grants the HHS Secretary

115. See, e.g., id.
116. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2705 (“Medicaid Global Payment System
Demonstration Project”), 42 U.S.C. § 1315a note (2012).
117. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 10607 (“State demonstration programs to
evaluate alternatives to current medical tort litigation”), 42 U.S.C. § 280g-15 (2012).
118. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2705(1) (“Wellness Program Demonstration
Project”), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4 (2012).
119. See, e.g., COMM. ON RAPID ADVANCE DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS: HEALTH CARE FINANCE
& DELIVERY SYS., BD. ON HEALTH CARE SERVS., INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., FOSTERING
RAPID ADVANCES IN HEALTH CARE: LEARNING FROM SYSTEM DEMONSTRATIONS (Janet M.
Corrigan, Ann Greiner & Shari M. Erickson eds., 2002), available at http://faculty.law.miami.edu/
mcoombs/documents/CoombsFosteringRapidAdvancesinHealthCare.pdf (proposing a series of
demonstration projects involving primary care delivery information technology, insurance coverage,
and state liability reform).
120. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3021(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1315a(a)(1) (2012).
The mission of CMI is to “produce better experiences of care and better health outcomes for all
Americans at lower costs through improvements.” Karen VanLandeghem, Innovation Center
Established to Improve Health Outcomes and Reduce Costs, ASS’N OF MATERNAL & CHILD HEALTH
PROGRAMS,
http://www.amchp.org/AboutAMCHP/Newsletters/Pulse/Archive/2011/March2011/
Pages/Feature3.aspx (last visited Jan. 17, 2014). See generally The CMS Innovation Center, CTRS.
FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., innovations.cms.gov/ (last visted Jan. 17, 2014).
121. See VanLandeghem, supra note 120; Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3021, 42
U.S.C. § 1315a(f) (2012).
122. See Robert Mechanic & Stuart Altman, Medicare’s Opportunity to Encourage Innovation in
Health Care Delivery, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 772, 773 (2010) (noting the importance of the large
appropriation for effective operations).

791

[Vol. 41: 765, 2014]

Building a Better Laboratory
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

significant authority in managing demonstration projects—authority that
may increase the projects’ ultimate impact on policy.123 Historically,
demonstration projects have been challenging to initiate because they require
political as well as financial support to create and administer.124 Given the
time-consuming nature of project approval, creation, operation, and formal
evaluation, many years may pass between the initial conception of a project
and the reporting on its results, potentially limiting the usefulness of the
project.125 Even when projects seem to have been successful, Congress has
not always responded by making policy changes.126
Policy analysts suggest that the ACA may help to address these
problems.127 First, under the ACA, the Secretary would have the authority to
select particular models to be tested from a group of models that “address[] a
defined population for which there are deficits in care leading to poor
clinical outcomes or potentially avoidable expenditures.”128 This authority
allows the Secretary the freedom to direct government resources toward the
reform approaches deemed to be the most promising in the current
environment, rather than being restricted to focusing on specific statutorilymandated projects.129 Second, the ACA prohibits the Secretary from
123. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3021, 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a)(1) (2012).
124. See Michael S. Barr et al., Lessons for the New CMS Innovation Center from the Medicare
Health Support Program, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1305, 1305 (2010) (noting that “CMS already has the
authority to conduct demonstrations and pilot programs” but that “the agency’s activities to date
have been limited by a host of political, legal, and budgetary constraints”); William M. Sage, Why
Are Demonstrations of Comprehensive Malpractice Reform So (At All) Controversial?, 37 U. MEM.
L. REV. 513, 526 (2007) (discussing barriers to creating federal malpractice demonstration projects).
125. See Stuart Guterman et al., Innovation in Medicare and Medicaid Will Be Central to Health
Reform’s Success, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1188, 1190 (2010) (discussing the lengthy timelines involved in
typical demonstration projects).
126. See Mechanic & Altman, supra note 122, at 772 (describing congressional failure to expand
Medicare’s bypass surgery global fee demonstration).
127. See Barr et al., supra note 124, at 1305 (stating that the ACA “strengthens the CMS’s
authority and capacity to foster innovation” and “addresses some of the historical boundaries placed
on the agency”).
128. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3021, 42 U.S.C. § 1315a(a)(1) (2012).
129. See Chris Fleming, Health Affairs Blog Roundtable Transcript: CMS and Health Reform,
HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Apr. 29, 2010), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2010/04/29/health-affairs-blogroundtable-transcript-cms-and-health-reform/ (quoting Bruce Vladeck, former administrator of the
Health Care Financing Administration, as saying that “for the first time really since the early 1980s
CMS is going to have the resources to essentially do noncongressionally mandated experimentation
and program development”); Mechanic & Altman, supra note 122, at 773 (contrasting CMI’s “broad
authority to select the programs best suited to its objectives” with “CMS’s Office of Research,
Development, and Information,” which “has far less flexibility, because a large proportion of its
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requiring models to be budget neutral during the initial testing phase;
neutrality requirements had hampered previous demonstrations.130 Third, the
ACA requires the Secretary to terminate or modify models in some
circumstances,131 a requirement that analysts suggest “gives the CMS greater
flexibility to design and develop new models.”132 At the same time, the
ACA allows the Secretary to expand the duration and scope of the model in
other circumstances,133 which will facilitate quicker and more widespread
adoption of successful pilot programs.134 Thus, CMS and its demonstration
projects will likely play an even more important role in the future in
fostering innovation across states and across delivery systems.135
Waivers and demonstration projects are important not just for
encouraging innovation, but also for promoting evaluation and increasing
the likelihood that knowledge generated by the innovation diffuses across
the country. Some sort of evaluation component is typically part of waiver
and demonstration programs. In a previously funded series of malpracticerelated demonstration projects, for example, grant recipients were “required
to submit patient safety data to [the federal Agency for Healthcare Research
and Quality’s] network of patient safety databases” using pre-specified
formats.136 This kind of requirement not only ensures the availability of data
for direct evaluation, but also facilitates comparisons across different
projects, by standardizing data collection.137
The ACA imposes a number of waiver- and demonstration-related
reporting requirements. Any state that takes advantage of the ACA’s broad
resources are devoted to congressionally mandated projects.”).
130. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3021, 42 U.S.C. § 1315a(b)(3)(A) (2012); see
also Barr et al., supra note 124, at 1305; Mechanic & Altman, supra note 122, at 773 (referring to
neutrality requirements).
131. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3021, 42 U.S.C. § 1315a(b)(3)(B) (2012).
132. Barr et al., supra note 124, at 1305.
133. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3021, 42 U.S.C. § 1315a(c) (2012).
134. See Mechanic & Altman, supra note 122, at 772 (“This provision is critical, because the
need for congressional approval has delayed or derailed past initiatives.”).
135. The ACA contemplates that CMI will launch pilot programs testing both state-based reforms
(such as state all-payer payment reform) and health care delivery reforms (such as payment reform
for diagnostic imaging services). See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3021, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1315a(b)(2)(B)(vi), (xi) (2012).
136. Fact Sheet: Patient Safety and Medical Liability Reform Demonstration, WHITE HOUSE
(Sept. 17, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/fact-sheet-patient-safety-and-medicalliability-reform-demonstration.
137. See id.
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waiver in order to implement the state’s own program for expanding
coverage, for example, must submit periodic reports concerning program
implementation, and the Secretary must conduct periodic evaluations of such
programs.138 States seeking to participate in the ACA demonstration project
involving bundled payments to Medicaid providers must provide “relevant
data necessary to monitor outcomes, costs, and quality.”139
The ACA requires evaluations of models tested by CMI. Specifically, it
authorizes the Secretary to impose data collection and reporting
requirements on demonstration participants and requires the Secretary to
analyze the “quality of care furnished under the model, including the
measurement of patient-level outcomes and patient-centeredness criteria
determined appropriate by the Secretary” and “the changes in spending
under the applicable titles by reason of the model.”140 It also requires
evaluation results to be made publicly available.141 These requirements will
help to ensure an effectively functioning federal laboratory.
2. Federal Support for Delivery System Experimentation
In many ways, the federal support for delivery system experimentation
resembles its support for state experimentation. The ACA relies heavily on
demonstration projects and pilot programs, for example, as mechanisms to
promote innovation and assure evaluation.142 It establishes a pilot program
on payment bundling under which a group of health care providers
“including a hospital, a physician group, a skilled nursing facility, and a
home health agency” would receive a bundled payment covering services
delivered in conjunction with a patient’s episode of care, beginning several
days before hospital admission and extending thirty days following a
patient’s discharge.143 This kind of pilot program could address providers’
current disincentives to reduce treatment costs, an issue discussed in Part

138. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1332(a)(4)(B)(iv)–(v), 42 U.S.C. §
18052(a)(4)(B)(iv)–(v) (2012).
139. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2704(d), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a note (2012).
140. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3021(b)(4)(A)(i)–(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 1315a(b)(4)
(2012) (the word “titles” is changed to “subchapters” in the U.S. Code version).
141. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3021, 42 U.S.C. § 1315a(b)(4)(B) (2012).
142. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2704(a), 124
Stat. 119, 323–24 (2010); id. § 3023.
143. Id. § 3023(c)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-4(c)(2)(A) (2012).
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III.B.
The ACA also creates a demonstration program “to test a payment
incentive and service delivery model that utilizes physician and nurse
practitioner directed home-based primary care teams designed to reduce
expenditures and improve health outcomes.”144 Many of the models that the
ACA proposes for testing by CMI involve health care delivery reforms, so
much of the discussion in Part III.C.1 is actually even more relevant for
delivery system experimentation than for state experimentation.145
Other ACA provisions, some of which build on earlier federal policies,
are more squarely aimed at health care market features that undermine health
care providers’ incentives to innovate. Part III.B highlighted two such
features: the difficulty of assessing health care quality and the fact that
payment often does not reflect quality. The ACA includes numerous
provisions intended to enhance quality reporting.146 In addition to requiring
reporting in connection with specific demonstration projects, it mandates the
development and public reporting of health care quality measures more
generally.147 In addition to potentially facilitating providers’ efforts to
identify and address quality problems, public reporting may provide
reputational and financial incentives to do so.148 The ACA also takes a more
144. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3024, 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-5(a)(1) (2012).
145. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3021, 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a)(b)(2)(B) (2012).
Examples include “[c]ontracting directly with groups of providers of services and suppliers to
promote innovative care delivery models, such as through risk-based comprehensive payment or
salary-based payment,” and “[e]stablishing community-based health teams to support small-practice
medical homes by assisting the primary care practitioner in chronic care management, including
patient self-management, activities.” Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111148, § 3021(b)(2)(B)(ii), (viii), 124 Stat. 119, 390–91 (2010).
146. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3002, 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4 (2012)
(improvements to physician quality reporting); id. § 3004, 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (2012) (quality
reporting for long-term care hospitals, inpatient rehabilitation hospitals, and hospice programs); id.
§§ 3013–15 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. 299 (2012)) (provisions on quality
measurement and public reporting).
147. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 3013–15, 124 Stat.
119, 381–88 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. 299 (2012)) (provisions on quality
measurement and public reporting).
148. See Kristin Madison, The Law and Policy of Health Care Quality Reporting, 31 CAMPBELL
L. REV. 215, 215–26 (2009) (discussing nature and benefits of report card use). Congress did not
identify the specific quality measures to be used for reporting or value-based payment purposes. See
cf. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2701, 124 Stat. 119, 317
(2010) (“Adult health quality measures”). With respect to public reporting, there is a statutory
requirement that “[t]he Secretary shall report quality measures of process, structure, outcome,
patients’ perspectives on care, efficiency, and costs of care that relate to services furnished in

795

[Vol. 41: 765, 2014]

Building a Better Laboratory
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

direct route to incentivizing quality-enhancing delivery innovations: it
contains pay-for-performance provisions that tie Medicare payments to
quality measures for hospitals, physicians, skilled nursing facilities, and
other providers.149
These provisions focus institutional attention on
improving health care delivery, without dictating specific mechanisms for
quality improvement, thus preserving health care providers’ ability to
innovate.
IV. BUILDING A BETTER FEDERAL LABORATORY
Permitting state policy variation, financing and conducting
demonstration projects, addressing market information failures, and altering
provider payment mechanisms are all good ways to foster innovation and
evaluation in the health care system. The federal government could do
more, however, to build a federal laboratory. This Part explores additional
approaches to encouraging the development, evaluation, and diffusion of
policies and practices that increase health care access, reduce cost, and
enhance quality.
A. Policy Incentives
Building on several years of federal experience with quality reporting
and value-based purchasing, the ACA relies heavily on payment
mechanisms to encourage delivery system reform. By altering payment
formulas, it incentivizes providers to identify and implement strategies for
increasing efficiency or improving the quality of care.150
inpatient settings in hospitals on the Internet website of the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid
Services.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(b)(3)(B)(viii)(VII) (2012). With respect to value-based payments
to hospitals, the ACA requires that measures cover acute myocardial infarction, heart failure,
pneumonia, surgeries (as measured by the Surgical Care Improvement Project), and infections (as
measured by the HHS Action Plan to Prevent Healthcare-Associated Infections), as well as
consumer views as represented in the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and
Systems survey. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(o)(2)(B)(i)(I) (2012).
149. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3001, 124 Stat. 119,
122 (2010) (hospital value-based purchasing); id. § 3006 (skilled nursing facility and home health
agency value-based purchasing); id. § 3007 (physician services value-based payment modifiers); id.
§ 3008 (payment adjustments for hospital-acquired conditions).
150. Regulations for Medicare’s hospital value-based purchasing program give a glimpse of how
such incentives might be structured. See generally Medicare Program; Hospital Inpatient ValueBased Purchasing Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 26,490 (May 6, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 422
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In theory, similar sorts of incentives could be used to encourage more
innovation in state health policy. Congress has often promoted the adoption
of particular policies through its funding formulas. One well-known
example is its withholding of a portion of highway funds from states that
permit the purchase of alcohol by people under the age of twenty-one.151
Structurally, this sort of program could be said to resemble value-based
purchasing programs that rely on process measures of quality. The hospital
value-based purchasing program incentivizes timely administration of
antibiotics, a step that might improve treatment outcomes;152 the highway
funding program incentivizes the adoption of a policy prohibiting alcohol
sales to those under twenty-one, a step that might reduce highway accidents.
This sort of program makes the most sense when the federal government has
identified a policy change that it believes will benefit the public, but for
some reason states have failed to adopt it on their own.
When the best approach to achieving a policy objective is unclear, or
when it varies across states, financial incentives tied to policy outcomes may
be more appropriate. One illustration of an outcome-based incentive can be
found within the Race to the Top program for educational reform. Financed
by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the Race to the
Top program offers over four billion dollars in grants to states choosing to
adopt innovative programs to improve education.153 The application
guidelines for the competitive grant program specify a variety of selection
criteria. Most are the equivalent of structure or process quality measures,
although the application does not delineate specific steps that states must
take. For example, points are allotted for “[f]ully implementing a statewide
longitudinal data system” and “[i]ntervening in the lowest-achieving

& 480). The regulations tie payment to process-related quality measures (such as whether
antibiotics were received within one hour before surgery), as well as measures based on a consumer
survey. See id. at 26,515–16. They will also include three outcome-based quality measures (such as
thirty day mortality for heart attacks) in 2014. Id.
151. See 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2012) (“The Secretary shall withhold 10 per centum of the amount
required to be apportioned to any State . . . in which the purchase or public possession in such State
of any alcoholic beverage by a person who is less than twenty-one years of age is lawful.”).
152. See generally, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HOSPITAL VALUE-BASED PURCHASING
PROGRAM (2013), available at http://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-LearningNetwork-MLN/MLNProducts/downloads/Hospital_VBPurchasing_Fact_Sheet_ICN907664.pdf
(explaining the benefits of the hospital value-based purchasing program).
153. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., RACE TO THE TOP PROGRAM EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (2009),
available at http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf.
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schools.”154 The application also refers to outcome measures: 30 of 500
possible points are allotted for “[d]emonstrating significant progress in
raising achievement and closing gaps” based on measures such as high
school graduation rates and national testing results.155 In short, the Race to
the Top program offers to state policymakers financial incentives based on
structure, process, and outcome measures of educational quality.
Within the health care area, the Children’s Health Insurance Program
Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA) offers a similar sort of performance
bonus to states.156 To encourage greater enrollment of uninsured children in
Medicaid, the legislation tied financial incentives both to the adoption of
particular practices intended to increase enrollment and to the achievement
of enrollment targets.157 Federal officials have described this incentive as a
“first-of-its-kind payment incentive for states . . . that offset[s] some of the
costs associated with states’ success in covering more children in
Medicaid.”158 To be eligible for the bonus, states must implement five of
eight specified practices, such as eliminating asset tests for eligibility,
eliminating requirements for in-person interviews, and using a joint
application for Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program.159
States meeting these requirements could receive a bonus for every enrolled
child above a target threshold; the target was calculated by first adjusting
2007 enrollment by child population growth and then increasing this number
by several percentage points.160 In 2011, nearly three hundred million
dollars was awarded to twenty-three states that met the relevant criteria.161
154. Id. at 3.
155. Id. at 3, 7.
156. Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-3, 123
Stat. 8.
157. See Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA), KAISER
FAMILY FOUND. (Feb. 12, 2009), http://kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/childrens-health-insuranceprogram-reauthorization-act-of/ (describing CHIPRA).
158. INSUREKIDSNOW.GOV, CHILDREN’S HEALTH INSURANCE REAUTHORIZATION ACT ONE
YEAR
LATER:
CONNECTING
KIDS
TO
COVERAGE
5
(2010),
available
at
http://ccf.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/chipra-anniversary-report-final.pdf.
159. Id. at 10 n.22.
160. See KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED & GEORGETOWN UNIV. HEALTH
POLICY INST. CTR. FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, CHIP TIPS: MEDICAID PERFORMANCE BONUS 2
(2009), available at http://ccf.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Federal%20schip%20
policy_chip%20tip%20perf.%20bonus.pdf.
161. See Julian Pecquet, Obama Administration Awards $300 Million for Children’s Health
Care, THE HILL (Dec. 28, 2011), http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/health-insurance/201581-
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There is no similar provision in the ACA for state health policy reform.
The ACA encourages state innovation by giving states flexibility in
implementing federal requirements and funding demonstration projects, but
it does not rely on tailored financial incentives as a way to encourage the
adoption or diffusion of innovative policies. It is true that federal funding of
the ACA’s programs will affect state policies, as federal funding directed to
states always has. To obtain Medicaid funding, for example, states must
comply with federal mandates dictating the structure of their Medicaid
programs.162 But these federal payments do not generally vary with state
policy “processes” in the same way that reimbursement will vary with
hospital health care delivery processes. Nor does the ACA contain any
provisions that link federal financial support specifically to state health
policy outcomes.
What might a federal incentive for state health policy adoption look
like? Consider health benefit exchanges. Federal regulations could continue
to define some basic structural features of health exchanges while preserving
significant flexibility in order to accommodate innovation. But Congress
might simultaneously promise increased federal funding to states that find a
way to increase the number of insured residents above a defined threshold,
similar to the target already in place under CHIPRA.163 This approach
would give states the regulatory flexibility that many of them have called
for, while at the same time holding the states accountable for the policy
objectives Congress sought to achieve through the ACA.164 Through the use
obama-administration-awards-300-million-for-childrens-healthcare.
162. See 42 U.S.C. 1396(b) (2012) (“Payment to States”).
163. See supra notes 156–60 and accompanying text.
164. Another example of an area in which the federal government could tie payment to quality
metrics is Medicaid. Under the health reform statute, private Medicare Advantage plans will receive
payments based on their “star ratings,” which are in turn based on measures related to the provision
of care, such as screening and vaccination rates, as well as measures related to customer service and
member satisfaction. See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 § 1102(b)–(c), 42
U.S.C. § 1395w-23 (2012); see also REACHING FOR THE STARS: QUALITY RATINGS FOR MEDICARE
ADVANTAGE
PLANS,
2011,
KAISER
FAMILY
FOUND.
(2011),
available
at
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8151.pdf (describing the rating system).
If similar types of ratings were extended to Medicaid programs, then program administrators would
have a financial incentive to focus on areas in need of improvement. Some Medicaid programs have
already begun to institute reimbursement mechanisms for Medicaid providers that take into account
quality metrics. See generally KATHRYN KUHMERKER & THOMAS HARTMAN, COMMONWEALTH
FUND, PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE IN STATE MEDICAID PROGRAMS (2007), available at
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Publications/Fund-Reports/2007/Apr/Pay-for-Performance-inState-Medicaid-Programs--A-Survey-of-State-Medicaid-Directors-and-Programs.aspx.
For an
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of policy incentives, the federal government could increase the reward that
individual states receive from effective policy reform, helping states
overcome barriers that might otherwise impede innovation.
Outcome-oriented incentives in the state policy setting, like outcomebased quality measures in the health care delivery setting, would raise many
substantive policy concerns.165 Identifying an easily collectible and
verifiable metric that accurately reflects policy objectives may be difficult.
An incentive that directs focus toward a particular objective may divert
focus from other, equally desirable objectives. States may engage in
practices that help them achieve the defined target but undermine other
policy goals. The details of how targets are defined will make it easier for
some states to achieve the targets than others, inviting political conflict over
target criteria. Note, however, that given the tremendous variation in state
circumstances, any policy directed at states could be said to impact one state
more than another. These concerns about the implications of outcomeoriented incentives suggest that the domains in which such incentives might
be appropriate are limited, but incentives nevertheless may have the
potential to encourage innovative state efforts to achieve federally defined
policy objectives.
B. Regulatory Variation and Regulatory Menus
When federal policymaking displaces state laboratories, it not only shuts
down a major source of innovation, but also eliminates the variation that so
often provides a foundation for evaluating an innovation’s effects. Waivers
and demonstration projects can help to address this problem, as can various
statistical methods of evaluation, such as differences-in-differences analyses
that compare the differences in pre-policy and post-policy outcomes between
groups differentially impacted by a policy. But another approach would be
to adopt a federal mandate that preserves variation in a purposeful way. As
Abramowicz, Ayres, and Listokin suggest, randomization is one way to

example of a program supporting value-based purchasing, see Value-Based Purchasing,
MEDICAID.GOV,
http://www.medicaid.gov/State-Resource-Center/MAC-Learning-Collaboratives/
Value-Based-Purchasing.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2014). Presumably, federal subsidies tied to
metrics would encourage more such contracting.
165. See generally Madison, supra note 148, at 226–36 (discussing problematic aspects of quality
report cards).
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build a foundation for studying the effects of policy approaches.166
Consider, for example, the ACA’s menu labeling requirements.167 Just a
few years before the ACA was enacted, states such as California168 and
Maine169 and cities such as New York170 and Philadelphia171 mandated that
certain restaurants include nutrition-related information on their menus. A
few studies have now been published assessing the impact of these early
reporting requirements.172 The details of the study designs vary, but most
share a common structure: they compare pre-labeling behavior with postlabeling behavior in areas subject to a menu labeling requirement, while also
examining behavior in areas not subject to the requirement. Information
from mandate-free areas is important because it reveals trends influencing
behavior apart from the labeling requirement. Because the ACA imposes a
requirement for chain restaurants to display calorie information
nationwide,173 preempting state and local laws with different nutrition
labeling requirements,174 it may eliminate these mandate-free areas,
complicating future research efforts in this area.175 In short, while research
166. See Abramowicz et al., supra note 50, at 974–1005 (discussing how randomization might be
incorporated into policies).
167. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 4205, 21 U.S.C. § 343 (2012).
168. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 114094 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.).
169. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2500-A (West, Westlaw through 2013 1st Reg. Sess. and
1st Spec. Sess. of 126th Leg.).
170. N.Y.C., N.Y., HEALTH CODE § 81.50 (2014).
171. PHILA., PA., HEALTH CODE § 6-308 (2010).
172. See, e.g., Bryan Bollinger et al., Calorie Posting in Chain Restaurants, 3 AM. ECON. J.:
ECON. POL’Y 91, 92 (2011) (finding that after calories were posted in compliance with the New
York City menu mandate, average calories per transaction at Starbucks fell by 6%); Brian Elbel et
al., Calorie Labeling and Food Choices: A First Look at the Effects on Low-Income People in New
York City, 28 HEALTH AFF. w1110, w1117 (2009) (failing to find that menu labeling changed
purchasing patterns); Eric A. Finkelstein et al., Mandatory Menu Labeling in One Fast-Food Chain
in King County, Washington, 40 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 122, 126 (2011) (finding that menu
labeling did not affect purchases).
173. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 4205(b), 42 U.S.C. § 343(q)(5) (2012).
174. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 4205(c), 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(a)(4) (2012); U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS REGARDING THE
EFFECT OF SECTION 4205 OF THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT OF 2010 ON
STATE AND LOCAL MENU AND VENDING MACHINE LABELING LAWS (2010), available at
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInformation/Labeling
Nutrition/ucm223408.htm [hereinafter Guidance for Industry].
175. FDA regulations allow states and localities to petition for exemptions from preemption, so
some variation in labeling requirements is possible. See Guidance for Industry, supra note 174
(stating that “[s]tate and local governments cannot directly or indirectly impose any nutrition
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on the effectiveness of labeling will certainly continue, the ACA’s push
toward uniformity will increase the difficulty of discerning the effects of
menu labeling requirements.
How might this result have been avoided? In theory, Congress could
have mandated a gradual implementation of nationwide labeling
requirements, rather than imposing an immediate, universal mandate.
Researchers could then try to discern the impact of reporting by comparing
early-mandate areas to late-mandate areas. A variation on this approach
would be to mandate nationwide disclosure, but to vary its content.
Restaurants in some areas could be required to disclose calories, for
example, while restaurants in other areas could be required to disclose
calories and sodium content. Researchers could then examine whether the
disclosure of sodium had no effect, had the intended effect of reducing
sodium consumption, or had an unintended effect, such as an increase in
calorie consumption, which might occur if restaurant goers’ attention to
caloric content were diverted as a result of information overload. After a
few years of variation, regulatory uniformity could be imposed.
Whether the staggered mandate approach would successfully establish
the necessary conditions for plausible inference depends on many factors.
One such factor is the procedure used to ensure variation. Assigning
implementation dates or reporting requirements by any mechanism other
than random selection increases the likelihood that differences in
comparison groups stem from differences in their characteristics rather than
differences in the regulations imposed. A second factor is the behavior of
the regulated entities. National restaurant chains may oppose staggered
mandates out of a desire to preserve national uniformity in their restaurants.
If such a scheme were nonetheless implemented, chains may choose to adopt
the more stringent reporting requirements nationwide, undermining research

labeling requirements on chain retail food establishments that are not ‘identical to’ requirements
imposed by section 4205” but that “FDA’s regulations, at 21 C.F.R. 100.1, allow any State or
locality to petition FDA for an exemption from preemption”). The regulations state that “[t]he
agency may grant the exemption . . . if the agency finds that the State requirement will not cause any
food to be in violation of any applicable requirement under Federal law, will not unduly burden
interstate commerce, and is designed to address a particular need for information that is not met by
the preemptive Federal requirement.” 21 C.F.R. § 100.1(a)(2) (2013). It is not clear, however, how
many communities will take advantage of this option. In addition, communities that seek
exemptions are likely to be quite different from those that do not, undermining efforts to use such
variations to isolate labeling’s effects from effects associated with characteristics of communities
that adopt labeling.
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efforts that depend on the continued existence of a robust control group.176
A third consideration is that legislators might be reluctant to adopt staggered
mandates because they would clearly evidence a willingness to impose
mandates despite the existence of considerable uncertainty about their
effects.
Even if it is not feasible to directly impose variation via statute, it may
be possible to obtain variation via regulation. Consider menu labeling once
again. In the course of implementing the menu labeling requirements, the
FDA has had to make numerous choices about regulatory details, some of
which may influence labeling’s effectiveness. In the preamble to its
proposed menu labeling regulations, for example, the FDA explained that in
its earlier draft guidance, it had recommended that a food’s calorie
information have the “same color and contrasting background as the
standard menu item.”177 It then noted that it had received comments
suggesting that this approach would make calorie information less prominent
and responded by proposing that calories must be posted “in the same color,
or a color at least as conspicuous as the name of the associated standard
menu item, and with the same contrasting background as the name of the
associated standard menu item.”178 The FDA also discussed such quandaries
as whether to require listings of average calories or ranges of calories when
foods have multiple flavors or varieties, as well as what kind of statement
about daily caloric consumption might be best suited for providing context
for the calorie listings.179 These choices are quandaries because they might
have an impact on restaurant goers, but the nature of their impact is unclear.

176. An effort to prohibit restaurants from disclosing additional nutritional information about
their food, in order to preserve full regulatory variation, might be met with a First Amendment
challenge. Under the Central Hudson test for governmental restrictions on commercial speech, the
analysis would seem to turn on whether the government’s interest in experimentation is substantial,
whether the prohibition directly advances this interest, and whether the regulation is narrowly
tailored to serve this interest. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y.,
447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
177. Food Labeling; Nutrition Labeling of Standard Menu Items in Restaurants and Similar Food
Establishments, 76 Fed. Reg. 19,192, 19,206 (proposed Apr. 6, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R.
pts. 11 and 101).
178. See id. at 19,233.
179. See id. at 19,207–09 (discussing calorie averages and ranges); see also id. at 19,210. Two of
the statements considered by the FDA were “[u]sing 2,000 calories per day as a reference point,
consider how the menu item you select fits within your total daily calorie needs, which may be
higher or lower depending on age, physical activity, gender” and “[a] 2,000 calorie daily diet is used
as the basis for general nutrition advice; however, individual calorie needs may vary.” Id. at 19,210.
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Regulators could try to resolve a few of these quandaries through
regulatory variation. Imagine that instead of requiring a color that is “at
least as conspicuous,”180 or requiring the presentation of calorie ranges, or
selecting the shortest possible disclosure statement, the FDA conducted a
multiyear randomized controlled trial in which different restaurants were
required to comply with different requirements. For example, some
restaurants might initially be required to present calorie ranges for different
flavors, while others would be required to present averages. Information
about consumer understanding and consumption decisions could then be
collected and evaluated, allowing regulators to make a more informed
selection of a particular approach to presenting calorie information. The
FDA could randomize its requirements across states or across metropolitan
areas on the grounds that variation would permit greater study of the impact
of different features of menu labeling in a real-world setting.
Alternatively, it might be possible for the FDA to create a limited
“regulatory menu” from which regulated entities could choose the regulatory
approach they preferred. The idea of a regulatory menu is not new. Under
the federal “meaningful use” regulations, for example, providers seeking
financial incentive payments in connection with their adoption of electronic
health records must meet criteria defined by regulation, but must also meet
five additional objectives that they can select from a longer list of
possibilities.181 However, the purpose of the meaningful use menu of
objectives is to allow flexibility for providers, not to create a potential
foundation for research.182 By contrast, the purpose of the regulatory menu
suggested here would be to allow for the creation of a limited number of
comparison groups to facilitate research on the effects of regulatory choices.
If the regulatory choices were structured in such a way that different
entities would choose to subject themselves to different regulations, the
resulting variation might permit further study. Regulatory menus would
make the most sense in situations in which the likely impact of a particular
approach is so unclear that the resulting “assignment” of entities to
regulatory approaches is essentially random. For example, some restaurants
might have a slight preference for the shorter statement about daily caloric
180. Id. at 19,206.
181. See Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Electronic Health Record Incentive Program, 75 Fed.
Reg. 44,314, 44,327 (July 28, 2010) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts 412, 413, 422, and 495).
182. Id. (“We believe that establishing both a core and a menu set adds flexibility and allows the
minimum statutory set to be met.”).
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consumption because it fits their existing menu format better, while others
might have a slight preference for the longer statement because they believe
a longer statement would cause information overload and thus would
weaken the impact of calorie disclosures. As long as these two groups are
not systematically different (beyond their relative needs for menu space),
their choices would generate data that would help to inform regulators about
the implications of daily intake statements.
From the perspective of a researcher seeking to gather information about
the impact of a regulation, regulatory menus would not be as attractive as
regulation with variation. The worry is that whatever factors lead to an
entity’s choice of regulatory option may also contribute to regulatory
outcomes in unobservable ways, obscuring the effect of the regulation
itself.183 However, menus do have the advantage of preserving some
flexibility for regulated entities in contexts where regulators’ preferences for
a particular approach are not strong.
Like state laboratory-based experimentation, regulatory menu-based
experimentation could potentially generate useful information because of the
variation it allows. But unlike state laboratories, regulatory menus are
subject to the control of a single experimenter. The FDA could maintain the
same presentation format across all menu choices, but vary the daily intake
statement; alternatively, it could vary the presentation format, but maintain
uniformity in the daily intake statement. A state laboratory experiment
might produce fifty menu formats, while a regulatory menu constrains the
choices to two. Such constraints have the benefit of increasing the number
of jurisdictions that would take any given approach, improving regulators’
ability to make meaningful comparisons across jurisdictions. If each
jurisdiction were to implement its own unique menu labeling law, as
sometimes happens when states act as laboratories, then it would be difficult
to sort out statistically which particular features of the labeling laws were
generating each jurisdiction’s outcomes.184
The ACA’s preemption of state and local menu labeling requirements

183. If the groups were systematically different, but in ways that could be observed, it may be
possible to account for these differences in evaluating the results of the experiment.
184. For an examination of variation in state menu labeling requirements, see Ashley Arthur,
Note, Combating Obesity: Our Country’s Need for a National Standard to Replace the Growing
Patchwork of Local Menu Labeling Laws, 7 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 305, 313–20 (2010)
(deconstructing menu labeling requirements in New York, California, Washington, Pennsylvania,
and Indiana).
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suggests that the legislation was intended to achieve national uniformity in
labeling mandates, facilitating national chain restaurants’ efforts to maintain
menu consistency.185 Mandated variation would be inconsistent with that
intent, although only in the short term while experimental data was being
gathered. Regulatory menus would be less problematic if all restaurants in a
chain were permitted to choose the same menu option. The main argument
here, however, is not that regulatory variation is feasible or even desirable in
the case of federal menu labeling requirements. Instead, the argument is
simply that it may sometimes be desirable to enact federal statutes that
permit regulatory variation or regulatory menus, at least for a limited period
of time, in order to improve researchers’ ability to conduct careful studies of
regulatory effects.
C. Conditioned Waivers
Regulatory variation facilitates evaluation by giving federal regulators
the systematic variation they need to conduct their own policy experiments.
These approaches make the most sense when regulators have already settled
on a short list of reasonable, well specified policy choices, but are uncertain
about which policy would generate the best result: should a shorter daily
calorie intake statement be used or a longer, more detailed one? In many
settings, however, particularly ones involving the most innovative policies, it
will be difficult to develop a short list. In addition, political or practical
concerns may mean that federal policymakers are reluctant to take
responsibility for this type of broad experiment. An alternative approach
would be to encourage voluntary experimentation and evaluation on a
smaller scale, via conditioned waivers. Regulatory waivers could be
conditioned on regulated entities’ willingness to design, participate in, and
disclose to regulators (or the public) the results of a study, with the basic
parameters defined either as part of the waiver application process or
through criteria specified by regulation.
Accountable care organizations (ACOs), which have been described as
“networks of physicians and other providers that could work together to
improve the quality of health care services and reduce costs for a defined

185.
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patient population,”186 provide an illustration of circumstances under which
conditioned waivers might be useful. Under the ACA, ACOs that meet
certain requirements are entitled to keep a portion of any Medicare savings
they are able to generate through their management of care for a defined
group of Medicare beneficiaries.187 To function effectively, ACOs may need
to form relationships and engage in practices that implicate existing fraud
and abuse laws.188 The ACA addresses this issue by giving the Secretary of
Health and Human Services the authority to waive certain fraud and abuse
statutory requirements “as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of
this section.”189
The ACA did not specify the form that waivers should take.190 In
anticipation of the development of waiver-related regulations, health care
practitioners discussed a number of options.191 One approach would be to
grant waivers based on a review of the risks and benefits of individual
proposed arrangements.192 The Office of the Inspector General of the
Department of Health and Human Services has historically engaged in a
similar process, in which it reviews potentially problematic arrangements
described by providers, considers their purposes and risks, and then
determines whether their adoption would be grounds for administrative
sanction.193 This case-by-case approach has the advantage of allowing
regulators to scrutinize the details of particular arrangements, facilitating

186. Mark Merlis, Accountable Care Organizations (Updated), HEALTH AFFAIRS (Aug. 13,
2010), http://www.healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief.php?brief_id=23.
187. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj (2012).
188. See Merlis, supra note 186 (discussing legal barriers ACOs may face).
189. 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(f) (2012).
190. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(b)(3)(B) (2012).
191. See generally DOUGLAS A. HASTINGS ET AL., AM. HEALTH LAWYERS ASS’N, WAIVERS
UNDER THE MEDICARE SHARED SAVINGS PROGRAM: AN OUTLINE OF THE OPTIONS (2010),
available
at
http://www.healthlawyers.org/hlresources/PI/Policy/Pages/ACOWaivers-Options
Outline.aspx.
192. See id. at 4–5.
193. See Advisory Opinions,, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL: U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., http://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/advisory-opinions/index.asp (last visited Jan. 21, 2014). An
example of a response: “[w]e conclude that . . . while the Arrangement could potentially generate
prohibited remuneration under the anti-kickback statute if the requisite intent to induce or reward
referrals of Federal health care program business were present, the Office of Inspector General . . .
will not impose administrative sanctions . . . .” Re: OIG Advisory Op. No. 11-16 (Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs. Nov. 8, 2011), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/
2011/AdvOpn11-16.pdf.
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more concrete assessments of risks and benefits.194 This approach also
brings to everyone’s attention specific examples of arrangements that might
appeal to other providers and examples that might be helpful for
policymakers refining fraud and abuse laws in the future.195 It has the
disadvantage of imposing significant costs on both applicants and
regulators.196
A second approach is to issue blanket waivers for particular types of
arrangements.197 Regulators would describe the particular setting in which
the waiver would apply, enumerating any criteria that must be satisfied
beyond the general criteria for participation in the ACO program. This
approach may be less costly for both ACOs and regulators, since there is no
need to develop or review detailed, formal requests for waivers. It allows
for a wide variety of ACO arrangements, and it provides a measure of
regulatory certainty for entities considering forming new arrangements. For
regulators, the challenge in creating appropriate waiver criteria is to
anticipate the types of arrangements that ACOs might want to adopt under a
waiver and then select criteria that will ensure that the newly allowed
arrangements will promote the ACO program’s objectives without raising
the concerns underlying the fraud and abuse laws.
Federal regulators decided to adopt the blanket waiver approach.198
They issued an interim final rule defining five sets of circumstances in
which entities establishing or operating ACOs would be entitled to waivers
of certain fraud and abuse laws.199 Mindful of the risks that such blanket
waivers might create, they indicated that the waivers would be narrowed
over time
unless the Secretary determines that information gathered through
monitoring or other means suggests that such waivers have not had
the unintended effect of shielding abusive arrangements. In
194. See HASTINGS ET AL., supra note 191, at 4–5.
195. See id.
196. See id. The exhaustive attention given to one particular case is not a feasible standard for
every case. See, e.g., id.
197. See id. at 5–6.
198. See generally Medicare Program; Final Waivers in Connection with the Shared Savings
Program,
76
Fed.
Reg.
67,992,
67,999
(Nov.
2,
2011),
available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-11-02/pdf/2011-27460.pdf (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. ch.
V).
199. See generally id.
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particular, if we find that undesirable effects (for example, aberrant
patterns of utilization) have occurred because of the waivers, we
will revise this IFC to address those problems by narrowing the
waivers.200
Regulators will be able to monitor many types of utilization based on
the claims data generated as part of the Medicare program.201 They will also
have access to information about treatment quality that ACOs are required to
report.202 Attributing abnormal utilization patterns or undesirable quality
effects to abusive arrangements, however, would require a detailed followup investigation into the nature of the arrangements used and an analysis of
potential links between the arrangements, health care costs, and outcomes.203
To facilitate both innovation and evaluation in health care delivery,
regulators might have instead taken a third approach: a waiver conditioned
on an entity’s willingness to serve as a laboratory. By conditioning waivers
on a commitment to data reporting, analysis, or both, regulators could shift
at least some of the responsibility for evaluation of promising but potentially
problematic arrangements to the parties involved, while simultaneously
allowing for considerable flexibility in ACO implementation.
Consider the waiver granted for ACO beneficiary inducements.204 To
improve patient health and reduce expenditure growth, and to fulfill the
statutory requirement of promoting patient engagement,205 ACOs may want
to use financial incentives that encourage behavioral change. ACOs might
want to reward patients for adherence to a physician’s recommended
treatment regimen, for example. But ACOs might also be tempted to reward
patients for seeking care from ACO providers—a practice that might
improve patient health by facilitating ACOs’ efforts to manage care
internally, but might also interfere with competition with non-ACO

200. Id. at 68,008 (footnote omitted).
201. See id. at 68,004, 68,008.
202. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3022, 42 U.S.C. 1395jjj(b)(3) (2012).
203. See, e.g., Medicare Program; Final Waivers in Connection with the Shared Savings Program,
76 Fed. Reg. 67,992, 68,008–09 (Nov. 2, 2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR2011-11-02/pdf/2011-27460.pdf (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. ch. V).
204. See Medicare Program; Final Waivers in Connection with the Shared Savings Program, 76
Fed.
Reg.
67992,
67,993,
67,995,
67,999
(Nov.
2,
2011),
available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-11-02/pdf/2011-27460.pdf (interim final rule with comment
period; to be codified at 42 C.F.R. ch. V).
205. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 3022, 42 U.S.C. 1395jjj(b)(2)(G) (2012).
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providers. In addition, if it increases the total amount of care sought, the
practice might increase Medicare program costs. To avoid these sorts of
negative effects, an existing federal statute prohibits remuneration to
Medicare beneficiaries that is “likely to influence [the beneficiary] to order
or receive [a service] from a particular provider” if the service is covered by
Medicare.206
Striking a balance between the potential risks and benefits of beneficiary
inducement, the ACO regulations allow ACOs to provide beneficiaries free
or reduced-price goods or services, but only under specified
circumstances.207 Among other requirements, the goods or services must be
in-kind, have a reasonable connection to the patient’s care, and be preventive
or advance one of four clinical goals, such as adherence to a treatment
regime.208 In adopting this rule, regulators rejected suggestions that ACOs
should not receive a special waiver for beneficiary inducements.209 They
also rejected suggestions that ACOs should be permitted to use other kinds
of financial incentives, such as reduced or eliminated patient cost-sharing
requirements.210 In addition, regulators left some specific questions to be
answered, such as whether “preventive care” should be defined by
regulation.211
By structuring the ACO program rules and related waivers differently,
regulators could have allowed for more innovation in the nature of
incentives offered and more information about these incentives’ effects.
Imagine, for example, a waiver that would permit ACOs to use incentives of
the sort permitted under the actual regulations, but only for a random subset
of the beneficiaries assigned to them. Or, alternatively, imagine a waiver
that would permit ACOs to eliminate co-payments for a subset of their

206. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a)(5) (2012).
207. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(i)(6)(G), (H) (2012).
208. See Medicare Program; Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,958 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 425). The
interim final rule for ACO waivers contained the same provisions. See Medicare Program; Final
Waivers in Connection with the Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 67,992, 68,001 (Nov. 2,
2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-11-02/pdf/2011-27460.pdf (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. ch. V).
209. See Medicare Program; Final Waivers in Connection with the Shared Savings Program, 76
Fed. Reg. 67,992, 67,999 (Nov. 2, 2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-1102/pdf/2011-27460.pdf (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. ch. V).
210. See id.
211. See id. at 68,007.
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patients to encourage adherence, but only if they provided a similarly valued
in-kind incentive for adherence by a different subset of patients.
In either case, the ACO could be required to specify the precise nature
of the incentives involved, define the group of patients eligible for the
incentives, and identify the patients who actually received these incentives.
It could further be required to identify and report on clinical measures that
would allow for assessment of whether the incentives had had the intended
health effect. HHS could then supplement this patient-specific data with
quality and utilization data it already collects to determine whether the
incentive seems to have had unintended effects. Essentially, the ACO could
be asked to randomize its patients, then pass along the data generated by the
experiment as a condition of receiving a waiver of fraud and abuse laws
otherwise applicable to its use of incentives.
A permutation on this proposal would be to allow ACOs—perhaps
ACOs in different geographic market areas—to form coalitions to apply for
waivers. Waivers could be granted on the condition that coalition members
agree to randomization of incentive use among participating ACOs. This
approach would be more difficult to coordinate and perhaps less attractive to
ACOs concerned about being randomized to the control group, but it would
allow for consistency among an ACO’s assigned beneficiaries.
A conditioned waiver that takes this form would offer some advantages
over existing approaches to eliciting information about beneficiary
inducements. Under existing regulations, ACOs are required to “define,
establish, implement, evaluate, and periodically update processes” to
“[p]romote patient engagement.”212 The shared savings program application
requires ACOs to submit narratives describing how the ACO will complete
these tasks.213 Federal regulators may therefore have some access to
information about incentives that ACOs plan to use. This information,
however, may not be sufficiently detailed to allow for clear evaluation or
provided in a format that would allow for straightforward aggregation of
data across ACOs. ACOs may be required to undertake evaluations, but the
regulations neither specify the nature of the evaluation nor require reporting

212. 42 C.F.R. § 425.112(b) (2013).
213. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
MEDICARE SHARED SAVINGS PROGRAM APPLICATION 18 (2012), available at
https://www.cms.gov/sharedsavingsprogram/Downloads/Medicare_Shared_Savings_Program_Appli
cation_2012.pdf.
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of evaluation results.214 A conditioned waiver could be used to make more
meaningful data available to regulators in forms that could be used to
perform broader evaluations. At the same time, conditioned waivers offer
some advantages over traditional, formal demonstration projects in that they
would allow for broader participation and more flexibility in the
arrangements adopted.
Another example of an area in which waivers conditioned on
experimentation might be useful involves a different type of incentive:
employer incentives for healthy behaviors. A number of employers would
like to offer wellness incentives through their health plans, such as rewards
for employees who reach a target cholesterol level.215 Incentives have the
potential to promote health, but they also have the potential to discriminate
against the unhealthy and make insurance unaffordable.216 In recognition of
both the benefits and risks of wellness incentives, the ACA allows incentives
tied to standards based on health-related factors, but limits their use.217 One
such limit is that, in the aggregate, these wellness rewards cannot exceed
thirty percent of the total cost of insurance coverage.218 But the statute also
contemplates the possibility of relaxing this limit: it grants the Secretaries of
Labor, Health and Human Services, and the Treasury the authority to raise
this limit to fifty percent “if the Secretaries determine that such an increase
is appropriate.”219
How might the Secretaries decide whether the increase is “appropriate”?
The Secretaries could solicit comments on the potential costs and benefits of
increasing the threshold. Insurers, employers, patient advocates, and
researchers in the field could relay their opinions about the actual impact of
the current threshold and predictions about the possible impact of a higher
threshold. The ACA, however, does not call for a demonstration project in
which the higher threshold would actually be tested. If regulators were able
(at least temporarily) to condition the availability of the fifty percent

214. See generally 42 C.F.R. § 425.112 (2013).
215. See Heather Baird, Note, Health Compromise: Reconciling Wellness Program Financial
Incentives with Health Reform, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1474, 1488–89 (2013).
216. See Kristin M. Madison, Kevin G. Volpp & Scott D. Halpern, The Law, Policy, and Ethics
of Employers’ Use of Financial Incentives to Improve Health, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 450, 451–54
(2011).
217. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2705, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j) (2012).
218. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2705, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(A) (2012).
219. Id.
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threshold on participation in a randomized trial (either among one firm’s
employees or across a coalition of firms), as well as on reporting of the
nature of incentives used and the relevant outcome measures, they could
generate more reliable information about the impact of higher thresholds.
There are both legal and practical impediments to this sort of arrangement,220
but when the implications of such a significant change in regulation are
unclear, the arrangement could provide very useful information while
limiting the population exposed to the risks. Ultimately, the Secretaries
increased the ceiling to fifty percent for certain programs targeting tobacco
use, but referenced other regulations, rather than empirical evidence, as the
basis for their decision.221
Federal and state governments impose many different types of reporting
requirements, and many government programs, including waiver programs,
require some sort of reporting as a condition of participation.222 A waiver
explicitly conditioned on experimentation, however, might help build a
stronger foundation for generating evidence on the impact of specific policy
approaches. The federal government has shown a willingness to condition
policies on systematic data collection or experimentation in the past. Under
the Medicare program’s coverage with evidence development policy, for
example, Medicare pays for certain services only for patients participating in
a registry or clinical trial involving those services.223
Treating
experimentation as a condition for a waiver might generate useful
information in a wider set of policy domains.224
Broader implementation of conditioned waivers would involve many
challenges. If the conditions for waivers go beyond reporting requirements
to include some sort of randomization in exposure to a particular program,
policy, or practice, questions of ethics and equity will invariably arise.

220. See Madison et al., supra note 216, at 463–65 (describing legal and practical impediments to
research on employer use of incentives).
221. Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health Plans, 78 Fed. Reg.
33,157, 33,166-67 (June 3, 2013), available at https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2013/06/03/
2013-12916/incentives-for-nondiscriminatory-wellness-programs-in-group-health-plans.
222. See discussion of Section 1115 waivers in Part III.A.
223. See Steven D. Pearson, Franklin G. Miller & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Medicare’s Requirement
for Research Participation as a Condition of Coverage: Is It Ethical?, 296 JAMA 988, 988–89
(2006) (describing coverage with evidence development policy).
224. Several policy analysts have suggested that CMS adopt an “innovation with evidence
development” approach to implementing system innovation. Guterman et al., supra note 125, at
1190–91.
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Some patients may be upset if they do not qualify for incentives, while
others do. Critiques of Medicare’s coverage with evidence development
policy have raised questions both about fairness generally and about the
need to treat aspects of the policy as research—a classification that would
bring with it a mandate for informed consent as well as a host of other
requirements.225 Regulatory and policy experimentation, like medical
experimentation, raises many ethical issues.226 The fact that under the
conditioned waiver approach, the experiment would be conducted by the
regulated entity, rather than directly by the regulator, would not eliminate
those concerns and may even exacerbate them.
Conditioned waivers could also be burdensome, particularly relative to a
policy such as the blanket waiver for ACO beneficiary inducement, which
requires neither an application nor waiver-specific reporting. Waivers that
allow for a lot of flexibility and involve minimal oversight reduce burdens
on both regulators and regulated entities. But the more attention regulators
devote to crafting reporting and other requirements, whether through blanket
waivers or case-by-case consideration of waiver applications, the higher the
likely quality of the resulting evaluation. Ultimately, the benefits of more
and better information must be weighed against the risks of discouraging
waiver requests and chilling innovation. Conditioned waivers will not
always be an attractive regulatory approach, but in areas where the need for
additional information is particularly acute, they may be worthwhile.
V. CONCLUSION
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act facilitates
experimentation among both states and providers by preserving flexibility,
supporting demonstration programs, and altering incentives. At the same
time, however, the federal government could do more to promote
innovation, systematic evaluation, and widespread dissemination of findings.
By tying funding to policy outcomes, making use of regulatory variation,
and conditioning waivers on systematic evaluation, the federal government
could improve the performance of the nation as a laboratory.
225. See Pearson et al., supra note 223, at 989–90.
226. See Abramowicz et al., supra note 50, at 963–74 (discussing ethical and equality issues
implicated by randomizing law). See generally ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF SOCIAL
EXPERIMENTATION (Alice M. Rivlin & P. Michael Timpane eds., 1975) (exploring ethical issues in
social experimentation).
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This Article used health-related examples to illustrate each of these
policy approaches. Information failures and other flaws that plague health
care markets, along with the significant federal role in financing health care,
make the health area especially well-suited for federal initiatives designed to
enhance experimentation. But these same approaches could be applied to
other areas of policy, too. In enacting regulations, regulators often must
decide on a regulatory approach with limited information about the potential
impact of their choices. Scholars have called for retrospective evaluation of
regulations,227 and an executive order states as a general principle that the
regulatory system “must measure . . . the actual results of regulatory
requirements.”228 Regulating with variation could help support measurement
efforts, regardless of the particular policy area affected.229
There would undoubtedly be many policy, political, and practical
challenges involved in building a better federal laboratory, whether through
the approaches suggested in this Article or others. But given the potential
benefits of health system experimentation, it is important to begin to
confront these challenges.

227. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese, Federal Regulations: Let’s Review the Rules, L.A. TIMES (Apr.
29, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/29/opinion/la-oe-coglianese-regulations-20110429.
228. Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 18, 2011).
229. Cary Coglianese notes that “[t]o do retrospective evaluation well, agencies must engage in
advance planning: making early decisions about how data will be defined and collected over time
and what relevant control groups might be used for making comparisons.” Coglianese, supra note
227. Regulatory variation could be part of this sort of advance planning process.

815

[Vol. 41: 765, 2014]

Building a Better Laboratory
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

***

816

